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Chinese courts have not vigorously enforced many human rights, 
but a recent string of employment discrimination lawsuits suggests 
that, given the appropriate conditions, advocacy strategies, and 
rights at issue, victims can vindicate constitutional and statutory 
rights to equality in court.  Specifically, carriers of the hepatitis B 
virus (HBV) have used the 2007 Employment Promotion Law to 
bring legal challenges against employers who have discriminated 
against them in hiring.  Plaintiffs’ relatively high success rate 
suggests official support for making one prevalent form of 
discrimination illegal.  Central to these lawsuits is a broad 
network of lawyers, activists and scholars who actively support 
plaintiffs, suggesting a limited role for civil society in the world of 
Chinese law.   While many problems remain with employment 
discrimination, China has made concrete steps toward repealing a 
legal edifice of discrimination stretching back decades, and 
reshaping both policies and attitudes to eradicate discrimination in 
the workplace.   
 
 In 2003, two young college graduates almost got jobs in 
China’s elite civil service.  Zhou Yichao, handsome and 23, scored 
well on both the written test and the oral interview, ranking eighth 
of the 157 applicants.  Zhang Xianzhu, 25 and bespectacled, 
ranked first among the thirty applicants in his hometown.  Both 
men then took medical examinations, the final phase of the 
Chinese hiring process.  Their medical examinations revealed both 
men carried the hepatitis b virus (“HBV”), rendering them 
ineligible for government posts, according to provincial regulations 
on civil service examinations.  Both were surprised by this result.   
Zhou Yichao first contemplated suicide, but upon 
reconsideration, bought a paring knife, went to the government 
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office to ask about the results, and then stabbed two civil servants, 
killing one.  Zhang Xianzhu also took an unexpected course of 
action.  He retained a prominent discrimination lawyer and sued 
the government agency for violating his constitutional rights.  
Around these two cases—the murder trial of Zhou Yichao, and the 
administrative litigation initiated by Zhang Xianzhu, a legal 
movement coalesced.  China’s HBV community—which at that 
point comprised a couple of online chat rooms and discussion 
boards—seized upon these cases to launch a multifaceted 
campaign to introduce antidiscrimination laws, eliminate 
employment discrimination, and change social attitudes more 
generally.  Somewhat remarkably, HBV advocates have largely 
succeeded on the first mission, lobbying government bodies to 
institute legal protections.  But discrimination by employers, and 
discriminatory attitudes more generally, remain deeply rooted in 
contemporary China.    
Since these events unfolded in 2003, advocates have 
petitioned government bodies, conducted campaigns to increase 
public understanding of the actual health risks of HBV, and 
litigated dozens of discrimination lawsuits.  The government’s 
response has been impressive.  In at least three national laws (falü), 
and six administrative regulations (guize), Chinese government 
bodies have addressed the employment rights of disadvantaged 
Chinese, including women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, and 
carriers of infectious diseases (like HBV and AIDS).  Central to 
the government’s various legislative responses has been the careful 
mobilization of the HBV community, which has drafted 
recommendations and petitions to government agencies, sent open 
letters to Chinese government leaders, and commented on draft 
legislation prepared by the national legislature.  This has opened a 
discussion about the nature of discrimination in China, but also 
about the role that citizens play in eradicating it. 
Discrimination is a prevalent, if little poorly understood, 
social problem in China.  The shift from a state-controlled to a 
market-based economy in the past thirty years has impacted 
virtually every aspect of Chinese society, from raging economic 
growth to a floating population larger than most countries.  But it 
has also opened up new opportunities for people to assert their 
freewill, whether in the form of new products to purchase, new 
forms of leisure, and new occupations.  It has also given 
employers, once bound by the diktat of centralized economic 
 
 




planning, considerable autonomy to hire, and to discriminate in 
that process. 
Discriminatory practices and attitudes do not, of course, 
materialize out of thin air.  One of this article’s primary arguments 
is that the Chinese government—at all levels—plays a leading role 
in promoting discrimination.1 By mandating an earlier retirement 
age for women, as it has since the early 1950s, the Chinese 
government signals to society that women are frail, merit special 
treatment, and cannot work as hard or long as men.  Likewise, the 
household registration system (hukou) stamps a person as either 
rural or urban, and links his access to social benefits to the locality 
where he registered.  Given the enormous gap between rich cities 
and poor villages, and the difficulty of changing one’s hukou 
status, Chinese villagers face dim job prospects, and a thicket of 
municipal restrictions on hiring out-of-towners.  Official barriers 
against carriers of infectious diseases also remain intact.  As seen 
above, civil service positions require applicants to be free of 
infectious diseases, even when the job itself presents no risk of 
contagion. 
Facing such policies, and social attitudes that reflect similar 
distrust and disfavor, advocates of various stripes—non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), public interest lawyers, 
concerned citizens, government-operated non-governmental 
organizations (GONGOs) and others—have mobilized in various 
ways to challenge discrimination.  In close contact with the media 
and online channels, these advocates have raised awareness, 
lobbied legislative and administrative bodies to repeal 
discriminatory regulations and pass protective ones, and filed 
dozens of lawsuits claiming employment discrimination.  This 
article argues that the mobilization efforts, as well as the legislative 
and administrative responses by government bodies, indicate a 
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newfound responsiveness of the Chinese government to a core 
issue of human rights: equal employment.   More important, the 
fact that courts have routinely found for victims of discrimination 
suggests the level of commitment is more than merely 
“discursive,” or paper on the books.  While we can, and will, 
rightly questions the efficacy of remedies ordered by Chinese 
courts, it is clear that officials across various sectors of the Chinese 
government agree that discrimination against HBV carriers, if no 
one else, is worth proscribing. 
This article proceeds in five parts.  Because the field of 
employment discrimination is so vast, this article narrows the 
scope by focusing on three large disadvantaged groups: women, 
migrant workers, and carriers of infectious diseases.  Because 
discrimination itself is a multifaceted phenomenon, this article 
adopts several methodologies to analyze the current status of 
discrimination in China, and laws that prohibit it. , including 
interviews with lawyers and activists involved in discrimination 
issues, analysis of verdicts brought by victims of discrimination, 
sociological materials on social movements, and conventional 
methods on the excavation and interpretation of current (and 
annulled) Chinese law and regulation.  An interdisciplinary 
approach permits reflection both on the nature of existing Chinese 
law, as well as the processes and peoples that have led to its 
reformulation and revision. 
Part I briefly describes the historical context in which to 
situate the issues, and reviews competing concepts of employment 
discrimination as developed in the West. 
Part II describes the most common, and perhaps most 
serious, manifestations, encountered in contemporary China.  
These can be overt: job advertisements openly express preferences 
or limitations based on gender, health status, age, height, 
household registration and so on.  The prevalence of 
discriminatory preferences in job advertisements reflects both the 
popularity of such attitudes, and the impunity employers enjoy in 
screening candidates in this manner.  Alternatively, more covert 
forms of discrimination are practiced in the selection process itself.  
Employers deploy a wide range of techniques to exclude women, 
hepatitis B carriers, and other disfavored groups (women under 
5’2,” or over 30 years; men under 5’5,” or over 35 years old).  
Medical examinations, photographs, CVs, written examinations, 
and other “objective” forms of documentation provide employers 
 
 




the pretextual grist needed to weed out undesirable applicants.  
During the interview itself, employers may ask female candidates 
about their marital status and future plans for children.  Through 
such processes, distinctively discriminatory workspaces are 
produced, reproduced and normalized in factories, stores, and 
offices. 
Part III outlines the law of employment discrimination prior 
to the Employment Promotion Law.  It attends to laws that both 
promote and proscribe discrimination, highlighting the essentially 
ambivalent role that the Chinese government has played in this 
regard.  On the one hand, China has instituted a number of 
discriminatory laws and practices in its sixty-year history.  
Women, for instance, must retire before men, a form of 
paternalism perhaps plausible in 1958, when the regulation was 
first passed, but no longer apposite half a century later.  Likewise, 
State Council regulations issued in the 1980s – and still in effect – 
foreclose job opportunities to infectious diseases carriers due to 
concerns about contagion.  But these restrictions sweep too 
broadly, and do not accurately reflect the likelihood that a potential 
worker could spread the disease if given the position.  On the other 
hand, national legislation—such as the Labor Law and the 
Women’s Law—has prohibited discrimination against various 
groups since the early 1990s, albeit with only modest legal 
protections and remedial mechanisms.  More recent regulations 
have furthered the cause of antidiscrimination against migrant 
workers and infectious disease carriers, though with varying 
degrees of success. 
Part IV explains how advocates for one particular 
disadvantaged group—HBV carriers—have effected legal change 
in the area of employment discrimination.  Using sociological and 
political theory, this part describes how a social movement has 
coalesced around the issue of HBV discrimination.  Spurred by the 
cases of Zhou Yichao and Zhang Xianzhu, HBV advocates have 
activated a wide range of civil society actors—carriers, public 
interest lawyers, concerned citizens, online discussion boards, 
NGOs—to champion the rights of HBV carriers.  Using media 
pressure and online tools to mobilize public opinion, HBV 
advocates adopted a multipronged strategy to challenge many 
forms of discrimination, including employment discrimination.  By 
litigating cases, and encouraging thwarted jobseekers to come 







consequences.  As employment rights are the core socioeconomic 
rights that China claims to privilege, judges are often sympathetic 
to the discrimination claims of HBV carriers.  Activists also 
petition Chinese government bodies to suggest ways to resolve 
problems with existing law, and point out areas which law should 
cover.  These various strategies have convinced several 
government agencies to issue regulations to protect the rights of 
roughly 120 million carriers. 
Part V examines the 2007 Employment Promotion Law, 
and its progeny of lawsuits.  The law expands existing legal 
protections, but also offers victims of employment discrimination a 
new tool by which to challenge discrimination: access to courts.  
By suing, affected jobseekers can vindicate labor rights that have 
existed almost exclusively as theory or principle for the past two 
decades.  It is too early to decide whether litigation will 
meaningfully alter the practices and attitudes of Chinese 
employers, but the threat of losing a lawsuit may deter some from 
discriminating.  Still, a great deal of work must still be done to 
advance this key human right.  Accordingly, the end of this part 
offers ways to make the law more effective. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Historical Background 
 Throughout its short history, the PRC has always had 
antidiscrimination law.  The 1954 Constitution, in a nod to the 
recently annexed Tibet and Xinjiang, guaranteed the right to 
equality for all ethnic groups: “The People’s Republic of China is a 
unified multiethnic nation.  All ethnicities shall be equal.  It is 
prohibited to discriminate against or oppress any ethnicity . . . .”2   
This is the sole usage of the word in the 1954 Constitution,3 and 
one of two in the current Constitution.4  But it was not the only 
provision to address discrimination.  Its close correlate, equality, 
also appeared—as it has in all four of China’s constitutions—to 
guarantee equality between men and women in the social, political, 
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cultural and educational fields.5  Gender equality has long been a 
central concern for the Chinese government, but it remains an 
elusive goal to achieve.  
During the early years of the PRC, women gained traction 
in the fields of culture, education and employment, but made less 
progress in social rights, and remained largely invisible in the 
political sphere (as they do today).  In other words, a wide gulf 
separates the aspirations of equality enshrined in the Chinese 
Constitution from the promotion of equality and proscription of 
discrimination in everyday life.  And since individuals cannot 
assert constitutional rights,6 without some kind of implementing 
legislation, the Constitution continues to inspire, but not safeguard, 
basic rights. 
 In the early days of the People's Republic, the Chinese 
government made concerted efforts to increase the role and 
visibility of women in the workplace.  The central government 
issued administrative regulations to staff women in fields 
traditionally dominated by men, such as the commercial and 
service sectors. 7   Women were also encouraged to enter 
professions formerly monopolized by men, such as tractor drivers, 
railroad engineers and pilots.  In this period, women worked in 
“every sector of the national economy, every industry, and every 
profession, revealing a huge potential labor force that had never 
been recognized or understood by the society or by women 
themselves.”8 
Under the planned economy, government personnel offices 
                                                 
5 See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 96 (1954) (P.R.C.) (providing that men and 
women enjoy equal rights in politics, economics, culture, society, family life, 
and all other aspects); XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 27 (1975) (providing that 
women and men enjoy equal rights in all aspects); XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 
53 (1978) (as the 1954 Constitution, but further specifying the principle of equal 
pay for equal work (tonggong tongchou)); XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 48 
(1982) (as the 1954 Constitution, but further providing that “The state protects 
women’s rights and interests, implements equal pay for equal work between 
men and women, and cultivates and promotes female cadres.”). 
6 See, e.g., ZHOU WEI, XIANFA JIBEN QUANLI SIFA JIUJI YANJIU [STUDIES ON 
JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR BASIC RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION] 118-119 (2003).    
Instead, lawyers must rely on statutes that implement constitutional protections 
in order to file cases in People’s Courts.  Id. at 119. 
7 Jiang Yongping, Employment and Chinese Urban Women under Two Systems, 
in HOLDING UP HALF THE SKY: CHINESE WOMEN PAST, PRESENT, & FUTURE 
207, 210 (Tao Jie et al. eds., 2004).  







made most employment decisions, which filled quotas in line with 
national economic policy.9  If an employee had little education, she 
was assigned usually to the same work unit as her parent.  A more 
educated employee could take an examination for entry into more 
specialized positions like teacher, scientist or engineer.10 
 At the same time, China also put in place restrictions that, 
however well-intentioned, have laid the foundation for today’s 
discriminatory edifices, practices and attitudes.  The differential 
retirement age for men and women is the leading example of 
unintended consequences.  Aimed at shortening the time a woman 
had to work in acknowledgement of her role in delivering and 
rearing children, the policy was initially seen as a boon to women 
when promulgated in 1957.11   Even now, fifty years later, the 
policy has come to signify something different: that women are 
somehow less capable or suitable than men for both labor and 
cadre positions.  As a result, many women are let go, often 
forcibly, five to ten years before their male counterparts, even if 
they want to keep working.12   
 Likewise, when instituted in 1958, the household 
registration system (hukou) restricted the movement of all Chinese 
citizens, keeping urban residents in cities and rural residents in the 
countryside. 13   Since that time, the Chinese government has 
systematically privileged the development of urban areas over rural 
ones.  The concentration of revenue into urban education, 
transportation, health care, social benefits and other services has 
made China’s cities much more attractive places to live.  But since 
the government restricted travel, and made changing one’s hukou 
status very difficult, rural residents were condemned to a lifetime 
of poverty,14 enjoying none of the “access to economic and social 
opportunities, activities and benefits” that their urban compatriots 
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the People’s Republic of China, in EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN CHINESE 
CULTURES: HALF THE SKY 49, 51 (Cherlyn Skromme Granrose, ed., 2005). 
10 Id. at 51. 
11 Ding Hua, Laodong zhengce/zhengce zhidingzhongde shehui xingbie pingdeng 
huigu yanjiu [Review of Gender equality in Labor Law and Policymaking], in 
XINGBIE PINGDENGDE FALÜ YU ZHENGCE [LAWS & POLICIES TOWARDS GENDER 
EQUALITY] 167, 187 (Tan Lin & Du Jie eds., 2008). 
12 See infra, Part III.B. 
13  FEI-LING WANG, ORGANIZING THROUGH DIVISION & EXCLUSION: CHINA’S 
HUKOU SYSTEM 24 (2005). 
14 See infra, Part III.B. 
 
 




enjoyed.15  At present, urban residents tend to view rural residents 
(many of whom migrated to the cities for low-end jobs) with a 
mixture of contempt and hostility.  In addition, city governments 
have issued a raft of ordinances that privileges local (urban) 
residents over outside (rural) residents in employment, education, 
and social services. 
 With the opening up of the market economy in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and move away from central planning, the problem of 
discrimination crept into employment decisions.  No longer firmly 
fixed to their work units, Chinese citizens had greater mobility to 
pursue a broader range of employment opportunities.  Employers, 
no longer bound by state hiring ordainments, could decide whom 
to employ with little outside input.  In this newly emergent space 
resurged a host of traditional attitudes about women, outsiders, 
illness and disability.  Stereotyped thinking still retains currency in 
the minds of many Chinese, and finds analogues across a wide 
variety of government policies and legislation. 
B.  Defining Discrimination  
 Before examining the legal edifices that promote and 
proscribe employment discrimination, and both are central to 
understand any society’s patterns and configurations of 
discrimination, some discussion of discrimination itself is needed.  
Employment discrimination is a complicated phenomenon, 
involving conscious decisions and unconscious assumptions about 
a person due to qualities supposedly possessed by virtue of her sex, 
race, national origin or other immutable characteristic.  In the 
United States, federal courts distinguish direct discrimination, also 
known as disparate treatment, from indirect discrimination, or 
disparate impact.  Direct discrimination—“the most easily 
understood type of discrimination”16—occurs when an employer 
treats a person less favorably than someone else due to a protected 
trait, such as her gender, age or race.17  Indirect discrimination is 
somewhat harder to grasp, as it involves a facially neutral practice 
or policy with “a disproportionately adverse effect on 
minorities.” 18   Chinese scholars are fond of citing an 1870 
ordinance from the San Francisco City Council banning the use of 
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shoulder poles (or danbao). 19   Though facially neutral, the 
ordinance clearly targeted Chinese immigrants, who retained the 
use of the pole to transport objects in their adoptive homeland.  
Finally, systemic discrimination refers to policies or practices that 
have a disproportionately broad impact on a larger subpopulation 
(racial, geographical, professional, or otherwise). 20   The hukou 
system, it will be argued, constitutes the most pernicious form of 
systemic discrimination in contemporary China.  These concepts, 
though first articulated in the US and EU, have found currency 
among Chinese scholars researching discriminatory laws and 
policies in the PRC.  At the very least, they provide a framework 
upon which Chinese forms of discrimination can be compared and 
evaluated. 
The preceding definitions are particularly important 
because, like U.S. federal law, 21  Chinese law does not define 
discrimination, even as many laws proscribe it.  The lack of a 
formal definition has not hobbled the judicial development of 
antidiscrimination law in the United States, where courts routinely 
step in to fill gaps in legislation, whether by defining 
discrimination, creating judicial mechanisms such as burdens of 
proof by which to capture discriminatory conduct, or prescribing 
remedies. 22   But Chinese courts play a far less active role in 
defining and creating law and legal mechanisms.  Chinese courts 
do not have the power to review legislation, nor are they bound by 
precedents of higher courts, as they are in the United States.  
Instead, Chinese courts play a more active role in the enforcement 
of existing laws, rather than the creation or critique of law and 
policy.23 
                                                 
19  See, e.g., ZHONGGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO JIUYE CUJIN FA JIEDU [AN 
INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN INTERPRETATION] 70 (Xin Chunying ed., 2007) 
20  See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Systemic Task Force 
Report to the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1 
(2006). 
21 See Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue , 420 F.3d 658, 660 (Aug. 22, 2005).  
“Title VII does not define ‘discrimination’ . . . .  Lack of a definition leaves 
unresolved the question how important a difference must be to count as 
‘discrimination.’” 
22  See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW & PRACTICE 164-66 (2004). 
23 Of course, the Supreme People’s Court can issue judicial interpretations (sifa 
jieshi) of a particular law, which offer guidance to judges applying the law.  But 
the SPC has issued no such document regarding employment discrimination. 
 
 




II. CHINESE DISCRIMINATION  
 Chinese scholars have identified all manner of 
discrimination in China.  One Chinese scholar identified over a 
dozen forms of discrimination in employment alone. 24   Some 
forms, such as age and disability, are similar to U.S. federal law.  
Others would not properly be considered discrimination in the 
United States, but rather proxies of an employee’s abilities, such as 
academic background, CV, and work experience.  Still others 
reflect China’s unique socio-political conditions, such as region 
(e.g. antipathy for people from Henan province), household 
registry, and membership in the communist party.  Other bases 
reflect concerns about the human body such as height and 
appearance, or concern over the spread of disease, such as health 
status. To this list one must add categories already protected in 
Chinese national legislation, such as sex, religious belief, race and 
ethnicity.25 
Despite this profusion of categories, certain classifications 
are more pernicious than others.   Discrimination based on a 
person’s academic background, CV and work experience may 
usefully identify talent, giving employers a useful shortcut to wade 
through large number of job applicants in China’s crowded job 
market.  Yet other forms of discrimination—such as sex, health 
status, and household registration—serve only to disqualify 
persons based on outmoded thinking and irrational presumptions 
about the capacity to work productively. 
 This section examines three common manifestations of 
employment discrimination: job advertisements, statistical surveys, 
and personal narratives.  Job advertisements, both in print and 
online, help depict the culture of job recruitment.  Since these ads 
are often the first link in the chain of the hiring process, they are 
particularly valuable indicia of what is permissible, indeed 
expected, of applicants in hiring practices.  They also reveal the 
expectations and preferences that employers bring to bear on their 
personnel decisions.  Second, statistical surveys about attitudes and 
                                                 
24 Lou Yaoxiong, Woguo “Jiuye Qishi” de Fali Fenxi ji Duice [Analysis and 
Countermeasures for the Law of “Employment Discrimination” in China], 
BEIJING YOUDIAN DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUEBAN) [JOURNAL OF BEIJING 
UNIVERSITY OF POST & TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION)], 
July, 2004, 63, 64. 
25 See, e.g., Laodong fa [Labor Law], promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 







experiences of discrimination provide an empirical basis to 
understand which forms of discrimination are most widespread.  
Different studies have arrived at divergent conclusions about 
which forms of discrimination are most prevalent, perhaps 
inevitable whenever perceptions, personal experiences and other 
subjective forms of knowledge are analyzed.  Finally, personal 
narratives shed additional light on the experience of discrimination 
from the applicant’s perspective, while illuminating the techniques 
used to weed out candidates.  Interview questions, email exchanges, 
requests for photographs and other devices to smoke out 
“undesirable” job candidates may not be captured by statistics or 
other sources, but are critical to understanding the mechanics of 
employment discrimination in China. 
 
A.  Job Advertisements 
In the U.S. and U.K., critical assessment of job 
advertisements has provided important insights into the 
discriminatory preferences of employers.  In the U.S., for instance, 
gender and age discrimination surfaced in advertisements 
throughout the 1980s, even though federal law banned such 
preferences since the 1960s.26  In one survey, researchers found 
9.5% of advertisements in the classified section of various Sunday 
newspapers to be either “questionable or blatantly illegal.”27  Of 
these, 90% discriminated based on sex, whether for men or 
women.28  In the U.K., researchers noted a decline in the number 
of advertisements with age preferences from 1981 to 1991, 
suggesting that one form of illegal discrimination was on the wane, 
but still evident.29   
More recently, it has become common for U.S. employers 
to counter discriminatory preferences in job advertisements.  
Companies and organizations now routinely state that they are 
“Title IX” employers or that they “encourage applications from 
women and minority candidates.”  Whether this reflects greater 
tolerance by employers, or a heightened recognition of the value 
(moral, economic, or otherwise) of a diverse workforce remains an 
                                                 
26 John P. Kohl et al., The Ongoing Battle of Discrimination in Help Wanted 
Ads, 15 BUSINESS FORUM 8 (1990). 
27 Id. at 10. 
28 Id. at 11. 
29  Ann E. McGoldrick & James Arrowsmith, Recruitment advertising: 
Discrimination on the basis of age, 15 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 54, 55 (1993). 
 
 




open question.  Alternatively, this greater openness could simply 
respond “to tightened government regulation and threats of 
lawsuits.”30  Whatever the underlying reason, a notable shift away 
from discriminatory job advertisements is clearly detectable in the 
U.S. and U.K. 
China presents a far different picture, as recent studies 
show.  Zhihong Gao’s study of online recruiting, and Zhou Wei’s 
research on print advertisement,31 suggest that age, gender, and 
physical appearance remain critical criteria for employers.  Other 
factors, such as household registration and height, appear less 
frequently than age and gender, instead surfacing in more 
specialized or exotic positions.  Many advertisements contained 
multiple forms of discrimination—women under the age of 30, 
men over 5’5”— so these categories should not be thought of in 
isolation. 
Gao surveyed 955 white-collar job advertisements on 
ChinaHR.com, a leading employment website.32  She found that 
the most frequently cited discriminatory basis was age, which 
appeared in 24.2% of the ads, followed by gender (12.3%), and 
physical appearance (10.5%). 33   Further break down of the 
categories led to interesting, if predictable, results.  For example, 
gender restrictions targeted both men (5.5%) and women (6.7%); 
most of the former were for managerial positions, while most of 
the latter were for sales and clerical positions. 34   Such 
advertisements reinforce the traditional power structure that 
subordinates women to men.  Moreover, many ads for women 
contained other restrictions, such as age (typically under 30), and 
appearance (“good looking and fine-tempered”).  This multiplicity 
of restrictions suggests “a more demeaning dimension to gender 
discrimination” in China, namely that Chinese women “are treated 
. . . as sex objects . . . to please the eyes of male bosses and 
clients.”35 
Other surveys of China’s advertising restrictions reveal that 
                                                 
30 Zhihong Gao, Gender Discrimination in Chinese Recruitment Advertisements: 
A Content Analysis, 9 J. ASIA-PAC BUS. 395, 404 (2008). 
31  ZHOU WEI, FANQISHIFA YANJIU: LIFA LILUN YU ANLI [STUDIES ON 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW: LEGISLATION, THEORY, CASES] (2008).  Professor 
Zhou’s analysis is omitted from this draft. 
32Gao, supra note 30, at 405. 
33 Id. at 406-07. 
34 Id. at 407. 







age and gender weigh heavily on employers’ minds.  One study 
surveyed 568 firms across eight different job sectors, including 
goods/manufacturing, research/development, commerce/logistics, 
finance/public finance, and administrative/personnel.36  To ensure 
a broad snapshot of the picture of discrimination, the authors 
surveyed state-owned enterprises, collective enterprises, privately 
owned companies, foreign invested companies, and shareholding 
companies.37  Again, age was the preeminent factor, appearing in 
54.4% of the advertisements examined.  Among the more 
discriminatory sectors were finance, administration/personnel, and 
commerce and logistics; in these sectors, over half of the 
advertisements contained age restrictions, targeting candidates who 
were either 18 to 25, or somewhat more commonly, 25 to 35.38  By 
contrast, few employers specifically targeted persons aged 35 to 45, 
or 45 and over.39   
Gender was less prominent than age, but showed 
considerable variation across sectors.  Certain sectors preferred 
men.  22% of the advertisements in the production required men, 
while only 4% required women.40  Research and development was 
similarly skewed: 14% required men, while only 2% required 
women.41  Commerce and logistics likewise favored males by a 
ratio of 28% to 6%.42  But other sectors sought women, including 
administrative/personnel, by a ratio of 31% to 8%, and 
education/hygiene, by a ratio of 33% to 6%.43  These statistics 
certainly support the idea that men are preferred in industries that 
require physical labor or scientific skills, while women are valued 
for administrative skills or ability to teach. 
Though somewhat less prevalent than age or gender, hukou 
status also matters to many employers.  Though statistical evidence 
                                                 
36  See Zhu Aisheng, Sun Weixiang & Zhao Butong, Zhaopinzhong Qishi 
Xianxiangde Shizheng Yanjiu [An Empirical Study of Discriminatory 
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PRODUCTION] 74, 74 (2007).  The categories themselves include the backslash. 
37 Id. 
38  Id. Several of the bases discussed in this article—such as academic 
background, professional title, or work experience—would not constitute 
discrimination under U.S. law.  This reveals an important difference in 












is limited, one survey of Chongqing showed that 7% of 
advertisements contained hukou restrictions, but that over 20% of 
employing units restricted labor in this way.44  The author then 
conducted phone interviews with twenty of the employers that 
included the restrictions.  Among the reasons for the restrictions 
were (1) “We don’t know what to make of outside laborers; we do 
not know if they are thieves or hooligans;” (2) “We have never 
hired outsiders, nor thought to hire them;” (3) outsiders require a 
certain period of time to acclimate to Chongqing; and (4) 
“Outsiders’ habits are different from ours’.  We hired one before, 
but he was stubborn as a mule.”  Whether based in ignorance or 
limited experience, prevailing attitudes in at least one of China’s 
metropolitan areas suggests that deep prejudice towards outside 
labor. 
A culture of discrimination has congealed at the first step of 
the hiring process in China, presaging a process replete with 
discrimination.  Little wonder that workspaces in China are so 
clearly gendered, with men occupying posts at the managerial 
levels, and women suffusing the lower rungs of the service 
sector.45  While the evidence is more limited, negative attitudes 
towards “outsiders” (Chinese citizens with non-local residency 
status) likewise characterizes many employers.  If China seriously 
intends to rid of employment discrimination, some effort must be 
made to end discrimination in advertisements, which both 
naturalize and reproduce artificially segregated workspaces. 
 
B.  Statistics   
 Statistical surveys provide another glimpse at the problem 
                                                 
44 See Yuan Weiqin, Chongqing Wailai Wugong Jiuye Qishi Diaocha [Survey of 
Employment Discrimination against Chongqing’s Outside Workers], in JINZHI 
JIUYE QISHIDE FALÜ ZHIDU YU ZHONGGUO XIANSHI [LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT & CHINA’S REALITY] 171 (Zhou Wei et al. 
eds., 2008).  683 of 9,606 advertisements contained such restrictions, while 142 
employers out of 683 implemented such restrictions. Id. at 183-84. 
45 Given the Chinese preference for numerical slogans, it is no surprise that 
scholars have described this phenomenon as “the three manys and the three 
fews.”   Namely, “many deputies, but few executives; many low-level workers, 
few high-level workers; many idle, few busy.”  See generally Yi Xiaorong, 
Zhongguo Funü Quanyi Baohu Tanwei: yi Falü Yuanyuan wei Shijiao [A Micro-
exploration of the Protection of Chinese Women’s Rights and Interests: From 
the Perspective of Legal Sources], in SHEHUI XINGBIE PINGDENG YU FALÜ: 
YANJIU HE DUICE [GENDER EQUALITY & LAW: RESEARCH & SOLUTIONS 17, 22 







of employment discrimination.  Surveys usefully reflect both 
reality—which groups work at what level of society—and 
perceptions of reality—have you ever been discriminated against?  
Both reality and its perception are critical in understanding 
discrimination given the important role that perception plays in 
perpetuating discrimination. 
In May, 2006, scholars at China University of Political 
Science and Law interviewed 3,500 people and their attitudes and 
experiences with discrimination in ten large cities: Beijing, 
Guangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Shenyang, Xi’an, Chengdu, 
Zhengzhou, Yinchuan, and Qingdao. 46   The results provide a 
relatively comprehensive picture of the circumstances of 
discrimination in today’s China. 
One important indicator surfaced in responses to the 
question, “Is there discrimination in the field of employment 
today?”  85.5% responded affirmatively, while 50.8% of 
respondents—over one half—believed it was “extremely severe.”47  
A mere 6.6% replied that there was no discrimination.48  Likewise, 
a majority of respondents (54.9%) believed they had personally 
experienced some kind of discrimination in the hiring process.49  
Almost one-sixth (15.7%) of respondents experienced “very 
severe” or “relatively severe” discrimination.50 
Further breakdown of the types of discrimination is also 
revealing.  The most commonly cited form of discrimination, 
62.6% of respondents said, is academic discrimination, meaning 
the employer overemphasizes a candidate’s academic background, 
or that the educational requirement exceeds the actual necessities 
                                                 
46  Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Xianzheng Yanjiusuo [Constitution Research 
Center of the China University of Politics and Law], Zhongguo shida chengshi 
jiuye qishi zhuangkuang wenjuan diaocha  [Questionnaire survey on the 
situation of employment discrimination in ten large Chinese cities], in 
ZHONGGUO JIUYE QISHI XIANZHUANG JI FANJIUYE DUIXIANG [EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
STRATEGIES] 505 (Cai Dingjian ed., 2007). 
47 Id. at 507. 
48 Cai Dingjian, Fanjiuye Qishi Zonghe Yanjiu Baogao [Comprehensive 
Research Report on Antidiscrimination in Employment], in ZHONGGUO JIUYE 
QISHI XIANZHUANG JI FANJIUYE DUIXIANG [EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN 
CHINA: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STRATEGIES] 1, 23 









of the job.51   Health discrimination came in second at 47.7%, 
followed by appearance (36.7%), age (32.9%), household 
registration status (28.7%), and finally sex (21%).52  While this 
study did not find that sex discrimination is a particularly 
widespread strain of employment discrimination, other studies 
have concluded otherwise.  For instance, in a survey conducted by 
the Women’s Federation of Jiangsu Province, 80% of female 
college students had been rejected for a position due to their 
gender.53  And over a third of these women had multiple rejections 
of this sort.54 
 Likewise, the China Women’s Federation, together with the 
National Bureau of Statistics, conducted national surveys on 
women’s employment and social status in 1990 and 2000.  Over 
the course of that decade, employment rates for men and women 
dropped, but the decline was steeper for women.  In 1990, 90% of 
men were employed, but only 82% in 2000 (representing a 9% 
decrease).  For women, on the other hand, 76% were employed in 
1990, but only 64% in 2000 (representing a 16% decrease).55  For 
young and middle-aged urban women, the employment rate 
dropped from 88% to 72%.56  Women also accounted for a larger 
proportion of those laid off (56%), even though they make up a 
minority of the work force.57 
 Local surveys also indicate the relative absence of women 
in positions of leadership.  Hebei province, for example, conducted 
a survey of government employment in 1994.  The percentage of 
women in high-level management positions—whether in 
government enterprises, agencies or institutions—was well below 
1%.58  A more recent survey has found that only 4.1% of top 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 23-24. 
53 Zhang Lixia, Shilun Woguo Funü Jiuyequande Falü Baohu [Theorizing Legal 
Protection of Chinese Women’s Employment Rights], HENAN DAXUE XUEBAO 
(SHEHUI KEXUEBAN) [HENAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL (SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION), 
Jan. 2004, 104, 104 n. 2. 
54 Id. 
55 See Jiang Yongping, Zhongguo Xingbie Pingdeng Zhuangkuang ji Xingbie 
Pingdeng Zhengce Tuijin [The Situation of Chinese Gender Equality and 
Gender Equality Promotion Policies], http://www.china-
woman.com/rp/fs/open/html/mtgjb/tj.ppt#447,16,中国两性社会地位差距. 
56 Yi, supra note 45, at 22. 
57 Id. 
58  Yong-Qing Fang, Women’s development in Hebei Province, PRC, in 







leaders in government were women.59 
The situation is not much better for carriers of infectious 
disease, especially China’s 120 million HBV carriers.  Yirenping, a 
leading NGO that advocates on behalf of people with HBV, has 
recently surveyed the hiring practices of multinational corporations 
with offices in China.  According to a 2006 survey, 77% of 
multinational corporations claimed that they would refuse 
applicants carrying HBV. 60   Two years later, the same survey 
found that (a) 84% of multinationals still require job applicants to 
take physical examinations and submit the results, and (b) 44% 
would still turn down applicants who tested positive.61  The 33% 
decrease from 2006 to 2008 is a positive development.  But the 
fact that 44% would still discriminate, despite the fact that such 
discrimination is now clearly illegal after the 2007 Employment 
Promotion Law, is surprising.  It suggests, among other things, that 
foreign corporations are either unaware of legal developments in 
Chinese labor law, or unconcerned about their consequences.62  As 
we shall see below, this ignorance has led many foreign employers 
to face legal challenges in the past two years. 
 Likewise, scholars have conducted their own independent 
research on various subpopulations in China.  Ye Jingyi and Shi 
Yuxiao surveyed carriers of the hepatitis B virus about their 
                                                                                                             
(Cherlyn Skromme Granrose ed., 2004). 
59 See Yong-Qing Fang et al., National policy influence on women’s careers in 
the People’s Republic of China, in EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN CHINESE 
CULTURES: HALF THE SKY 49, 65 (Cherlyn Skromme Granrose ed., 2000).  
60 Discrimination against Hepatitis B carriers rising – survey, CHINA DAILY, 
Mar. 5, 2009, http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-
03/05/content_7542374.htm. 
61 Id.  The second survey was conducted in October to December, 2008, but the 
results were released in March, 2009. 
62  Chinese public sector employers, on the other hand, are perhaps more 
enlightened.  The majority of cases I have found online target corporations, 
Chinese or foreign.  Moreover, five government departments conducted a 
“knowledge competition,” complete with prizes, concerning the contents of the 
Labor Contract Law and Employment Promotion Law in November and 
December 2007.  Three of the eighty questions concerned employment 
discrimination.  See Wubumen Lianhe Juban Laodong Hetong Fa he Jiuye Cujin 
Fa Zhishi Jingsai [Five Bureaus Unite to Conduct a Knowledge Competition on 
the Labor Contract Law and the Employment Promotion Law], LAODONG 
BAOZHANGBU WANGZHAN [DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & SOCIAL SECURITY 








experiences with employment discrimination.63  Over half of the 
respondents (52.3%) claimed that they had been refused a job.64  
Of these people, 72.3% claimed they were denied the job because 
they failed to pass a physical examination,65 while only 11.7% 
believed the denial was for another reason. 66   Over half of 
respondents (56.3%) claimed to have experienced some form of 
discrimination while on the job, while almost one-third (32%) had 
been fired at one time. 67   In this last category, over 70% of 
respondents claimed that their employers told them the truth, that 
they were fired because they carried the hepatitis B virus, while 
18.8% said their employer used an excuse to terminate them.68 
 Statistics offer another window onto the realities of 
employment discrimination, illuminating the experiences of 
employees and applicants, as well as the attitudes and perceptions 
of employers and society at large.  A degree of subjectivity infuses 
many of these surveys, reflecting the nature of discrimination 
itself.  The experience of discrimination involves subjective 
determinations by job applicants who feel discriminated against, 
particularly if the reason for their refusal is never explicitly stated. 
But it also includes conscious and unconscious discrimination by 
employers, who may be unaware of their own biases.  Still, the 
surveys make clear that discrimination, perceived and otherwise, is 
widespread against various groups of people. 
 
C.  Personal Experiences 
 Though unverifiable through statistical means or numerical 
measures, anecdotal experience rounds out the portrait of 
discrimination.  Personal narratives explain three related themes.  
First, they bring to light actual techniques used by employers to 
                                                 
63 Ye Jingyi & Shi Yuxiao, You canji qishi dao jiankang qishi [From disability 
discrimination to health discrimination], in JINZHI JIUYE QISHI: GUOJI 
BIAOZHUN HE GUONEI SHIJIAN [EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS & NATIONAL PRACTICE] 318, 319 (Li Weiwei & 
Lisa Stearns eds., 2006). 
64 Id. 
65 The Chinese hiring process typically involves three examinations.  If one 
passes the written examination, she may then be invited for an oral examination.  
If successful at this stage, the candidate then must typically go for a physical 
examination at a nearby hospital.  









exclude qualified candidates.  Second, when repeated across over 
time and space, anecdotal experience illuminates which forms of 
discrimination are most prevalent.  Third, and with the first two 
explanations in mind, such narratives can guide discussions of 
ways to stop discrimination in the workplace.  If employers can 
pose personal questions to female job applicants during an 
interview—about marital status, boyfriends, plans to have children, 
and so on—women will never gain a foothold in the Chinese 
workforce.  Though dozens of anecdotes portray the actualities of 
hiring, two in particular shed light on the techniques used to weed 
out women. 
 First, a female job applicant emailed her resume into a 
company.69  She did not indicate her sex on the application, nor did 
she include a photograph, a common accompaniment of many job 
applications in China.  The employer called her the next morning, 
telling her that she did not include a photograph.  The applicant 
offered to send one off right away, but the employer stalled, saying 
they still wanted to “research other applications.”  She never heard 
back from the company, but believes the company nevertheless 
liked her resume.  Upon realizing she was female – as they could 
determine through the phone call – they lost interest.  The authors 
of this study suggested that this is a common method of ferreting 
out female candidates, constituting a hidden form of direct 
discrimination.70 
 Second, a female law graduate described her interview with 
a small research institute.71  The interview centered around three 
questions: Are you married?  Do you have a boyfriend?  How 
much do you want for a salary?72  Interviewers frequently question 
women about child care or pregnancy (planned or past), something 
that would be illegal under U.S. law.73  They do this directly, or by 
                                                 
69 See Tong Xin & Liu Meng, Tamen Weihe Chenmo: Nüdaxuesheng Zai Qiuzhi 
Guochengzhong Suozaoshoude Xingbie Qishi Yanjiu [Why Do They Keep Silent: 
Research on the Gender Discrimination Encountered by Female College 
Graduates in the Hiring Process], in XINGBIE PINGDENGDE FALÜ YU ZHENGCE: 
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EQUALITY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION] 243, 
251 (Tan Lin & Du Jie eds., 2008). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 254. 
72 Id. at 256. 
73 See King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 258 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1984) 
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asking them if they would be willing to move around to different 
cities with the job; if the applicants are unwilling, the employer 
will ask if she has a boyfriend.74  While this may seem like an 
unwelcome intrusion into one’s personal life, employers are not 
simply being nosy.  Rather, they are expressing concern about the 
high costs of hiring of an employee who may one day become 
pregnant.  She may be less active while pregnant, and will likely 
take maternity leave after the birth.  Since employers typically pay 
for the ninety days of maternity leave required by the Labor Law, 
many profit-minded employers would prefer to avoid this liability 
altogether.75  To extirpate discrimination against women, then, will 
require a change in thinking about responsibilities for child care (a 
normative matter), and the reallocation of the costs of providing 
maternity leave and child care (a policy matter). 
 With some understanding of the manifestations of 
employment discrimination, and a basic grasp of their underlying 
rationales, we now turn to the laws that both proscribe and promote 
discrimination. 
 
III. THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
A.  Antidiscrimination Law 
Only in the 1990s did Chinese law start to guarantee equal 
rights in employment.  The 1990 Law to Protect Disabled Persons 
mandated that “[n]o discrimination shall be practiced against 
disabled persons in recruitment, employment, obtaining permanent 
status, technical or professional titles, payment” and other areas.76  
The 1992 Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women 
(“Women’s Law”) first extended protections to women in 
numerous areas of employment: hiring and firing; titles, 
promotions, and salaries; and marriage, pregnancy and nursing.77  
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Questions about child care are technically neutral, but may disparately impact 
upon women. See id. 
74 Xin & Meng, supra note 69, at 256. 
75 Laodong fa [Labor Law], promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong. July 5, 1994, Art. 62. 
76  Canjiren Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons], 
promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Dec. 28, 1990, Art. 
34. 
77 Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and 
Interests], promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Apr. 3, 







Likewise, the 1994 Labor Law ensured that workers “shall not be 
discriminated against in employment due to their nationality, race, 
sex, or religious belief.”78  Despite these provisions, employers 
could discriminate with impunity against any protected class 
because the mechanisms to implement these laws were either weak 
or non-existent.79  Unlike the United States, China does not have 
an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to investigate 
allegations of employment discrimination.  Nor are there 
implementing regulations or judicial interpretations that tell courts 
how to handle employment discrimination claims, or how to 
remedy successfully litigated claims.80  Indeed, some courts refuse 
to accept employment discrimination claims on the grounds that 
they are not listed in the Regulation on the Causes of Action for 
Civil Cases, issued by the Supreme People’s Court.81 
Before the passage of the Employment Promotion Law in 
2007, Chinese law proscribed employment discrimination, but 
offered very little by way of remediation.  Before turning to the 
impact of the EPL, however, it is first necessary to examine the 
obverse of Chinese antidiscrimination law: those promoting 
discrimination.   
 
B.  Discriminatory Laws and Their Repeal 
 The Chinese government, both at the central and local 
levels, has promulgated a number of laws, regulations and 
ordinances that exclude persons from certain jobs, force women to 
retire early, or otherwise disadvantage them.  State-sponsored 
discrimination both naturalizes discriminatory practices (if the 
state discriminates, why shouldn’t I?) and perpetuates the 
marginalization of various groups outside the power structures of 
Chinese society.  The continued development of antidiscrimination 
law must carefully review the underlying rationale of these laws, 
compare it with contemporary realities, and decide whether 
amendment or withdrawal may be appropriate.  Many policies 
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menstrual period, pregnancy, obstetrical period and nursing period”); 
78 Laodong fa [Labor Law], promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong. July 5, 1994, Art. 12. 
79 Cai Dingjian, supra note 48, at 39. 
80 Interview with Professor Liu Minghui, China University of Women, Mar. 18, 
2009 (on file with author).  Other courts have, of course, accepted such cases as 








developed in the 1950s—when the P.R.C. was a “new” country 
inculcating a revolutionary spirit in its people—no longer match 
contemporary realities.  Upon reexamination, the issuing body may 
very well annul certain provisions.  In some instances, the 
government has already responded with appropriate changes, often 
after sustained pressure from the public, petition drives, and media 
scrutiny.  This work should continue, either through incremental 
revisions, or by passing an all-encompassing Antidiscrimination 
Law.82  This section outlines some of the major laws and policies 
that promote discrimination based on gender, hukou status, and 
infectious disease.  It then discusses recent changes or revisions to 
these discriminatory laws and policies. 
 
1A.  Gender Discrimination  
 A number of Chinese laws promote employment 
discrimination against women.  The most widely cited is the 
differential retirement age, mandating that women must retire five 
to ten years earlier than men.  In 1958, China’s highest executive 
body, the State Council, issued “Temporary Guidelines Handling 
the Retirement of Workers and Professionals,” which initially set 
the differential retirement ages. 83   Though these temporary 
guidelines were withdrawn in 2001, other State Council Guidelines 
from the 1970s continued the practice into the present.84 
 Differential retirement ages may have made sense in the 
1950s.  Government departments explained that women were 
generally weaker than men, and experienced considerable physical 
stress during the birth of children.  They thus needed time for leave 
and special maternal protections.  Since women were primarily 
responsible for raising children, it was “reasonable” for them to 
work less, and hence retire earlier. 85   In the immediate post-
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comprehensive antidiscrimination laws (on file with author). 
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[State Council’s Temporary Guidelines Handling the Retirement of Workers and 
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84 See infra, notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text. 
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revolutionary period, traditional notions about the division of labor 
still prevailed, despite some revolutionary stirrings about the 
proper role of women.  In practice, however, women would handle 
more of the domestic responsibilities, and men would provide for 
the family through outside work.86 
 A generation later, the State Council issued another set of 
“temporary” guidelines mandating differential retirement ages, 
both of which remain in effect.  In 1978, it promulgated both the 
“Temporary Measures on the Retirement and Resignation of 
Workers” (“Workers’ Measures”) and the “Temporary Measures 
on the Proper Arrangement of the Elderly, Weak, Infirm and 
Disabled Cadres” (“Cadres’ Measures”).  The Workers’ Measures 
provide, in relevant part, that “Workers in state-owned enterprises, 
institutional units, government or [communist] party organs, or 
mass organizations must retire upon reaching any of the following 
conditions: (1) males reaching 60 years, and females reaching 50 
years, after they have worked continuously for ten years . . . .”87  
The Cadres’ Measures, on the other hand, provide that “Cadres 
working in party or government organs, mass organizations, 
enterprises or institutional units can retire upon reaching any of the 
following conditions: (1) males reaching 60 years, and females 
reaching 55 years, after they have participated in revolutionary 
work for ten years.”88  In other words, the retirement age for men 
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Doc. 104 (1978) (emphasis added).  
88 Guowuyuan Guanyu Anzhi Laoruobingcan Ganbude Zanxing Banfa [State 
Council’s Temporary Measures on the Proper Arrangement of the Elderly, 
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is 60, whether they are cadres or workers.  But female cadres must 
retire at 55, and female workers at 50.  It is important to note that 
private companies are not bound by either directive, though they 
frequently force women to retire before men.89 
 Based on the national “Temporary Measures,” many female 
professionals are let go upon reaching the age of 55.  According to 
lawyers who litigate these cases, employers interpret the measures 
somewhat creatively.  The Cadres’ Measures state women “can” 
retire at 55, which would appear to give women the choice of 
whether to retire at 55.  But in reality, employers claim they “can” 
make women retire at 55, and quite a few have.  The employer’s 
decision to do so may be buttressed by local legislation that 
strengthens the position of the employer vis-à-vis the employee.90  
 Differential age restrictions harm women in several ways.  
First, for many women, their professional lives may only begin to 
blossom at age 50, particularly if they deferred professional 
commitments to raise children, obtain advanced degrees, or both.  
To require women to retire at 55, 5 years before their male 
counterparts, nullifies a lifetime of toil, trouble and deferred 
gratification. 
Second, retirement pensions are tied directly to the number 
of years worked.  If a woman retires five to ten years before a man, 
her pension will be somewhere between 7% and 20% less than a 
man’s.91  This ensures that differential treatment persists long after 
                                                                                                             
Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, May 24, 1978 (emphasis 
added). 
89 Interview with Professor Guo Huimin, Sept. 22, 2009 (on file with author).  
Professor Guo explained that women may make more money from social 
security than from their working wage.  From the company’s perspective, 
replacing older employees with younger ones can significantly lower payroll 
expenditures. 
90 See FUNÜ ZHONGGUO—ZHONGGUO [WOMEN’S WATCH—CHINA], ZHONGGUO 
NÜXING ZHUANYE JISHU RENYUAN TIQIAN TUIXIU: ANLI YANJIU [CASE 
STUDIES OF EARLY RETIREMENT OF FEMALE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL 
PERSONNEL IN CHINA] 58-62 (2008) (describing cases brought by women forced 
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had the right to make employment and termination decisions based on local 
legislation). 
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Retirement Age on the Gender Gap in Pensions of Urban Cadres and Workers], 
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In addition to early retirement, Chinese law also prohibits 
women from engaging in certain jobs.  Labor regulations prohibit 
women from working in mines, 92  felling and stacking timber, 
setting up scaffolding, demolishing buildings, working on electric 
power lines, and other jobs requiring dangerous or intense physical 
labor. 93   The regulations establish broader protections for 
menstruating women, pregnant women, and nursing mothers, who 
are barred from working in walk-in refrigerators, cold water, or 
other frigid jobs.94  It is unclear whether this form of paternalism is 
any more justifiable than the concerns underlying the early 
retirement system.  Some test of strength, stamina or agility would 
better replicate a person’s physical capacities than a blanket ban.  
Though arguably well-intended, these regulations underscore the 
general notion that women are not fit for the workplace, or some 
sizable fraction of it. 
Local regulations likewise discriminate against women.  In 
2003, Hunan published “Temporary Measures for Physical 
Examinations of Civil Servants,” which apply to civil servants, but 
also to those working in state-sponsored institutions such as 
universities and hospitals.  Article 22 requires that women who 
work in a medical facility’s gynecological department have 
“normally developed secondary sexual characteristics; symmetrical 
breasts symmetrical without lumps; vulva not be inflamed, 
ulcerous or tumorous; and uterus not be prolapsed.” 95   This 
certainly sounds like per se discrimination, at least to one trained 
in U.S. antidiscrimination law, since there are no corresponding 
anatomical specifications for male workers.  As they stand, 
however, these requirements heighten the burden on women, 
subjecting their bodies to notions of anatomical correctness that 
have no bearing on her capacity to perform the job at hand.  
Moreover, they also eliminate disabled persons, as well as disease 
carriers such as breast cancer survivors, suggesting a multiplicity 
of discrimination. 
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1B.  Efforts to Reform Gender Discrimination  
The most significant legal reform in the area of women’s 
rights generally,96 and discrimination specifically, was the 2005 
revision of the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and 
Interests (“Revised Women’s Law”).97  The law addresses several 
weaknesses in China’s existing legal structure, such as the 
underrepresentation of women in national and local politics, the 
fragility of women’s property rights, and the prevalence of sexual 
harassment in the workplace. 98   For the first time, 99  the law 
explicitly states that the promotion of equality between men and 
women is a “basic national policy,”100 lending additional rhetorical 
support to a position that the government has long exhorted. 
A group of elite scholars and officials began drafting 
revisions to the law in 2003, drawing heavily on international and 
comparative experience.101  This group included both members of 
government-run entities like the All China Women’s Federation 
and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as well as civil 
society actors such as the Center for Women’s Law and Legal 
Services at Peking University.102  Through workshops, conferences 
and roundtables, these scholar-activists helped channel 
recommendations from United Nations committees and other 
countries’ laws into the legislative process of the PRC.  While not 
all their suggestions made it into the law, they have laid out several 
issues—including discrimination, domestic violence and property 
rights—for future regulations and provincial implementing 
regulations. 
Despite various improvements made in the law, the 
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Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 103  issued a long list of concerns and 
recommendations in its 2006 Report (“Report”).  Three in 
particular relate to the present discussion.  First was China’s 
“capacity to understand the meaning of substantive equality and 
non-discrimination.” 104   Since many Chinese still do not 
understand the concept or problems of discrimination, the Report 
specifically recommended China include “a definition of 
discrimination against women in its domestic law, encompassing 
both direct and indirect discrimination.”105  As we saw above in 
Section II, the problem is quite widespread in China; one reason 
may be a lack of understanding as to why discrimination is a 
problem. 
A second concern was the lack of “effective legal 
remedies” for violations of the Convention, as well as “awareness-
raising and sensitization measures about such legal remedies 
against discrimination so that women can avail themselves of 
them.”106  Indeed, the lack of effective remedies, and failure to 
implement laws more generally, are constant criticisms leveled at 
the Chinese legal system.  As we will see later, in Section V, the 
discrimination against women in hiring continues in China, even 
while no plaintiff has stepped forward to challenge it.107 
A third concern was “traditional stereotypes regarding the 
role of women and men in society.”108  In other words, the divide 
between men’s work and women’s work remains relatively clear in 
China, with men occupying higher rungs, and women in down 
below.  The Committee recommended a broad campaign of 
education and awareness raising, “in particular to men and boys,” 
through radio, television and print media.109  The Committee also 
suggested the inclusion of gender sensitivity into school 
curriculum and textbooks. 110   The Committee had other 
suggestions as well, but they lie beyond the remit of this article. 
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As regards the differential retirement age, debate continues, 
though little forward momentum is detectable.  In April 2009, one 
of China’s most senior female politicians, Chen Zhili, called on the 
city of Beijing to take the lead in equalizing the retirement age for 
cadres.111  Noting that Beijing’s decision to do so “would have a 
huge influence on the rest of China,” Ms. Chen believed that 
achieving equality between the sexes would be greatly advanced 
by leveling the retirement ages.112  The mere fact that a person of 
Ms. Chen’s stature would make such an appeal is significant, and 
indicates some level of support among Chinese government 
officials.  Still, the fact that this proposal has not moved forward in 
over a year does not bode well for its implementation.  
 
2A.  Hukou Discrimination 
The household registration, or hukou, system helps 
maintain the physical separation of urban resident from their rural 
brethren.  Instituted in 1958, the system initially permitted the 
government to distribute resources and benefits more effectively, 
to control migration between from rural areas to urban settings, 
and to keep closer tabs on criminal activity. 113   Citizens were 
categorized according to their place of residence, and then whether 
they were rural (“agricultural”) or urban (“non-agricultural”).114  If 
you had a Beijing hukou, for instance, you benefited from the 
panoply of benefits (insurance, education, social welfare, and even 
food rations during the PRC’s more tumultuous periods) that 
Beijing provided its residents.  If, on the other hand, you lived in 
Beijing without a Beijing hukou, you could not have access to 
these services. 
In recent years, the system has relaxed somewhat. 115  
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Wealthy or educated rural residents can apply to become local 
residents of various cities, depending upon criteria set out by the 
city. 116   Currently, the estimated 150 million migrant workers 
working in Chinese cities offer proof that people are no longer 
tightly bound to their native village, as they once were in the early 
days of the PRC.  But this does not mean that life has become any 
easier for today’s migrant worker.  Typically, they toil at low-wage 
job without social security, a guaranteed wage, or access to 
medical care.  Equally troubling, their children are often ineligible 
to attend local schools, recreating another generation of 
marginalization. 
Reinforcing one’s hukou status is a raft of regulations that 
further disadvantage migrant workers.  National regulations, for 
instance, instruct local employers—private, public and state organs 
alike—on how to hire workers who come from outside their 
locality.117  One regulation from the Ministry of Labor provided 
that outside workers can be hired only if a) no local person is 
qualified to fill the position, and b) the local labor and employment 
agencies have approved the employer’s request for an outside 
hire. 118   That is, local people should receive priority in job 
recruitment, and outsiders can fill positions only when a local 
agency has approved of the placement.  While this regulation has 
since been withdrawn,119 it set a precedent to which many cities 
have clung, even in the present.  Nanjing, for instance, still 
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encourages employers to hire local laborers, guided by the 
principle of hiring “first urban, then rural; first this city, then other 
cities; first this province, then other provinces.”120  This privileges 
not only Nanjing residents, but also any other urban residents by 
mandating “first this city, then other cities.”  This represents 
discrimination against rural people in its purest form.  It does not 
merely privilege Nanjing residents, but any city resident, over her 
rural counterparts. 
Other cities restrict migrant labor in less nuanced ways.121  
Some have imposed quotas on the number of outside workers 
allowed to work in the city, either by enacting a strict numerical 
target, or setting a percentage of the total work force for 
outsiders.122  Other cities have prohibited, or severely restricted, 
the use of migrant workers in specific positions.  Shanghai, for 
instance, closed positions such as shop assistants, maintenance 
staff, and custodial positions to persons without local residency.123  
While not high status positions, they would likely appeal to the 
frequently less educated and privileged migrant class.  More 
expansively, Beijing placed restrictions on various white-collar 
positions such as administrators in the financial and insurance 
sectors, accountants, bank tellers and staff at “star-level” hotels.124  
Such regulations restrict the number of positions available to 
migrant workers, and steer them towards the most grueling jobs.  
Apart from job restrictions and prohibitions, cities have 
also levied fees on employers that hire outside workers, under the 
various guises of “registration fees,” “work management fees,” 
“processing fees,” “administrative service fees” and so on.125    The 
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effect is to drive up the cost of hiring outside workers more costly, 
and to encourage the hiring of local employees. 
Finally, cities may require migrant workers to obtain work 
permits, residency permits, health permits, and other 
documentation in order to work.126  The hassle of obtaining such 
permits, coupled with the fear that one’s status as a non-resident is 
automatically disqualifying, likely dissuades many migrant 
workers from applying for this paperwork.  In this way, cities can 
prevent migrant workers from taking up local posts, and greatly 
restrict the number of eligible candidates.  At the same time, such 
regulations generate revenue for the city from people who, on the 
whole, can least afford it.127 
 
2B. Efforts to Reform Hukou Discrimination 
The new millennium has witnessed a number of reforms to 
the hukou system.  While these had been percolating to some 
extent in the 1990s,128 a wave of dissatisfaction hit the Chinese 
press in 2000. In December 1999, the Beijing government 
published 103 additional job categories from which migrant 
workers would be barred.129  After vigorous academic debate, and 
most likely with the imprimatur of high officials, Chinese 
newspapers ran editorials and personal pleas from migrant workers 
that questioned the hukou system.130  One editorial acknowledged 
the problem of local protectionism, but asked whether senior 
officials had considered the national picture.131  Another noted that 
China was “treating its precious labor resources as a burden and 
inhibiting the economic interests, the very livelihoods, of tens of 
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millions or rural laborers.”132  News websites and internet bulletin 
boards also posted criticism of the system and calls for its 
reform.133 
Over time, even the official state news media took to 
criticizing the hukou system.  An article from People’s Daily made 
a number of strong claims, such as (a) residency and migration 
were “basic rights” (with the implication that they should not to be 
violated by state or local policy), (b) the hukou system itself was 
incompatible with China’s current economic development and 
tarnished its image of reform and openness, (c) the system enabled 
corruption, as evident in the prevalence of bribes to officials and 
the auctioning of local residency permits by small cities, and (d) 
abolishing the current system was “the general trend of history.”134  
The article ambitiously predicted that the system would one day be 
a vestige of the planned economy.135 
As noted, the central government had already initiated 
modest reform efforts.  In 1997, the State Council initiated an 
experimental program permitting migrant workers to obtain local 
hukou in selected small towns and cities.136  Provided that they had 
lived in the locality for at least two years, with a stable income and 
permanent residence, migrants could apply for permanent 
residency.137  The program proved to be something of success, as 
over 540,000 migrants became full residents in 328 cities, 138  
leading the State Council to expand the experiment to cover all 
small towns and cities.139  Nevertheless, given the episodic nature 
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of many migrant workers’ work assignments (construction, 
infrastructure) and the seasonal rhythms of their lives (returning 
home to their native villages during holidays) these requirements 
still exclude highly transient migrants, arguably the most 
precariously positioned.  And of course, large cities such as 
Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen—each of which employs millions 
of migrant workers—were exempt from the program. 
The State Council continues to issue directives that relax 
the hukou system, and mitigate the discriminatory effects of 
various local regulations.  In 2003, for instance, it issued a Notice 
on Successfully Managing Employment and Services for Migrant 
Workers. 140   The preface describes the current employment 
prospects for migrant workers in unusually candid terms.  They 
“still face a number of irrational restrictions in employment; their 
rights and interests are not effectively protected; they are not paid 
their due wages; they are charged excessive fees; and other serious 
phenomena.”141  The Notice then calls on local governments to 
“abolish irrational restrictions on the employment of migrant 
workers,” including the abolishment of administrative approvals, 
professional restrictions excluding migrants, and registration 
requirements.142  It also mandates that local governments impose 
the same technical qualifications and health standards on migrant 
workers as it did on local residents.143  With the Notice, the central 
government took a first step toward peeling away the encrustation 
of discriminatory provisions that had piled up from the 1990s. 
Subsequent regulations in 2004 and 2006 likewise target 
discriminatory regulations.  The 2004 Notice on Further Improving 
the Employment Environment for Migrant Workers praises the 
“large-scale work” in which various local cities and departments 
had engaged since the 2003 Notice.144  But it also recognizes the 
manifold problems facing migrant workers, including inadequate 
training services and recruitment opportunities, employment fees, 
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numerous procedures, unpaid wages, violations of their rights and 
interests, and “illegal elements” who defraud migrant workers by 
charging recruitment fees for non-existent jobs. 145   The 2004 
Notice repeats, almost word-for-word, the injunctions contained in 
the 2003 Notice to abolish administrative approvals, professional 
restrictions and registration requirements.  But it now calls them 
“discriminatory regulations and irrational restrictions,” an 
acknowledgment that these regulations offend both morality and 
reason.146 
In 2006, the State Council issued Certain Opinions on 
Resolving Problems of Migrant Workers. 147    The Opinions 
acknowledge the “important contributions” that migrant workers 
have made to the development of China, and articulate a series of 
programmatic steps to alleviate the burden of this disenfranchised 
subpopulation: 
Migrant workers are a new labor force that has 
sprung up in the processes of industrialization and 
urbanization during China’s reform and opening up.  
Their residency status is rural, but they engage 
primarily in non-agricultural production.  Some go 
out to do both industrial and agricultural work 
during the non-agricultural season, and are very 
mobile.  Others have been employed in cities for a 
long time, and comprise a large proportion of 
industrial workers.  A large number of migrants 
work in cities and towns, where they have made 
important contributions to the construction of a 
modern China.148 
 
Article 5 of the Opinions sets out basic principles, such as “equal 
treatment.”  It calls on cities to “Respect and maintain migrant 
workers’ legal rights, eliminate discriminatory regulations and 
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systemic obstacles to their working in cities, permit them to enjoy 
equal rights and obligations in urban professional employment.”149  
Other provisions address now familiar dilemmas of unpaid wages, 
labor contracts, employment services and training, and social 
protections.150 
But the problem, as the title intimates, is that these are 
merely opinions, so many statements of policy.  Though legally 
binding, they do not specify the sanctions a court should impose 
upon finding a violation, making it unlikely that a court of law 
would find against a municipality for contravening these 
regulations.  Like so much Chinese law, the Opinions propose 
prohibitions, but not sanctions to enforce those prohibitions. 
Despite some changes in the residency requirements, the 
essential structure of the hukou system remains largely intact.  By 
dividing citizens into agricultural and non-agricultural, and then 
allocating resources unevenly between the city and countryside, 
the PRC simply continues to reinforce the disenfranchisement of 
hundreds of millions of citizens.  Though recent reform efforts aim 
to ameliorate some of the discriminatory burdens that cities have 
attached to migrant workers, the systemic discrimination remains 
untouched.  By permitting greater mobility than it did fifty years 
ago, China has slightly blurred the division between urbanites and 
villagers.  Yet, as one scholar concluded, “Chinese society by and 
large can still be divided into an ‘agricultural’ segment and a ‘non-
agricultural’ one, and glaring differences remain in entitlements 
between the two.”151 
 
3A. Discrimination against Infectious Disease Carriers 
 With an estimated 120 million carriers of the hepatitis B 
virus,152 4.5 million known cases of tuberculosis,153 and 700,000 
carriers of HIV,154 a sizeable portion of the Chinese populace faces 
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the possibility of a different form of discrimination.  Quite apart 
from the public health concerns that such diseases raise, the 
Chinese government has also had to deal with employment-related 
issues, such as workplace safety and discrimination.155    For a long 
time, the government’s thumb was decidedly on the side of public 
health and safety.  Numerous laws and regulations excluded 
qualified persons who happened to carry the disease from a variety 
of positions.  Recent reform efforts, however, suggest both a 
growing willingness to entrench the rights of disease carriers, and a 
clearer awareness of the actual threat that such persons pose to 
public safety generally, and the workplace in particular.  Perhaps 
more important, citizen activism has played a critical role in 
promoting reform; the mobilization of public opinion has signaled 
to the Chinese government that hepatitis B discrimination is 
palpable, destructive, and in certain instances deadly. 
 A number of national laws and regulations prevent persons 
who carry infectious diseases from engaging in certain lines of 
work.  The relevant provisions reflect the comprehensible concern 
that placing an infectious disease carrier in certain occupations 
might facilitate the spread of disease.  Thus, the Food Safety Law 
prohibits persons with “dysentery, typhus, viral hepatitis, active 
pulmonary tuberculosis, or purulent or weeping skin diseases” 
from “working in direct contact with food for consumption.”156  
This provision excludes a narrow range of job possibilities for a 
narrowly tailored group of disease carriers.  Hepatitis A, for 
instance, can be spread through contaminated food or water,157 
while tuberculosis can be spread aerially when an infected persons 
coughs, sneezes or even speaks.158  Prohibiting carriers of these 
diseases from working in food production bears a rational 
relationship to public safety.   
But other regulations seem less defensible.  The 
Administrative Regulations on Public Hygiene, for instance, 
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restrict the same carriers of disease listed in the Food Safety Law 
from a wide range of posts.  The regulations target jobs where 
employees would have direct contact with customers: hotels, 
restaurants, inns, cafes, bars, teahouses, public baths, barber shops, 
beauty salons, movie theatres, dance halls, concert halls, gyms, 
public parks, museums, libraries and more.159   Without doing a 
separate epidemiological study for each disease, it seems pretty 
clear that this regulation sweeps a bit too broadly.   
Hepatitis B provides a good example.  It can be spread by 
birth; sex with an infected person; sharing needles, razors, syringes 
or toothbrushes with an infected person;  direct contact with blood 
or open sores of an infected persons; or exposure to blood from 
sharp instruments (as used in ear-piercing or tattooing).160  It seems 
highly improbable that a person with the hepatitis b virus is likely 
to spread the disease if working at, say, a movie theatre, museum, 
or bar, though one can certainly imagine a hypothetical situation 
where such “contact” may occur.  But by restricting carriers of 
HBV from all manner of public employment, the regulation sends 
a strong symbolic message, both to carriers and a public that is 
largely uninformed about the transmission of such diseases.  
Namely, carriers pose a health risk, should not work in public 
places, and should avoid coming into contact with the general 
public. 
Similarly, the 1989 Supervisory Regulations on Hygiene in 
Cosmetic Products ban some people from working directly in the 
production of cosmetics.  In addition to carriers of the disease 
listed above (viral hepatitis, tuberculosis, dysentery), persons with 
eczema, ringworm and other dermatological conditions are also 
prohibited.  This prohibition may be rational for ringworm, which 
can be spread through indirect contact, i.e., when a person touches 
an object that a second person then touches.  But eczema is not 
                                                 
159 See Gonggong Changsuo Weisheng Guanli Tiaoli [Administrative Provisions 
on Public Hygiene], promulgated by the State Council, Apr. 1, 1987.  Article 2 
lists the public places.  Article 7 lists the forbidden diseases.  See also 
Huazhuangpin Weisheng Jiandu Tiaoli [Supervisory Regulations on Hygiene in 
Cosmetic Products], promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 26, 1989.  Article 7 
banned the disease carriers mentioned above, plus persons with eczema, 
ringworm, and other dermatological conditions, from working in the production 
of cosmetics. 
160  See Center for Disease Control, Hepatitis B Information for the Public: 








contagious.161  Prohibiting persons with eczema from working in 
cosmetic production serves only to discriminate against them.  By 
excluding people in this way, the State Council signals that their 
skin problem—literally a superficial blemish—renders them unfit 
for the work of “beautiful people.”  
These restrictions entrench discrimination against carriers 
of diseases, excluding capable workers from jobs based on 
unfounded fears, and not genuine science.  Regulators should 
instead determine the nexus between the spread of the disease 
(whether through casual contact, blood, bodily fluid, etc.) and the 
likelihood of contagion for a particular position.  They can then 
specify which diseases are particularly contagious, and which 
positions should be off limits for medical reasons.  Some comfort 
can be drawn from the fact that these quite sweeping regulations 
were issued in the 1980s, whereas more recent laws—like the 2009 
Food Safety Law162 noted above—significantly narrow the scope 
to a few forbidden posts.  But until these regulations are formally 
withdrawn, they remain valid law in the PRC.  And since recent 
promulgated laws often explicitly carve out job posts proscribed by 
early regulations and directives passed decades ago, these 
regulations continue to generate prejudice against people. 
 
3B. Efforts to Reform Discrimination against Infectious 
Disease Carriers 
Not long after the Zhang and Zhou incidents, various government 
bodies set about revising laws and regulations.  In 2005, the 
Ministry of Personnel issued the government’s first responsive 
regulation, permitting some carriers of the hepatitis b virus to work 
in civil service positions.163  Applicants with “chronic or acute 
hepatitis” were still barred, but “antigen carriers” who had been 
examined could still work.164 
 In 2007, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
promulgated two regulations that entrench the employment rights 
of HBV carriers.  The first, Opinion on Protecting the Employment 
Rights of Carriers of the Hepatitis Surface Antigen, deals 
                                                 
161 JANET ZAND ET AL., SMART MEDICINE FOR HEALTHIER LIVING, 259 (19 99). 
162 See supra, note 133, and accompanying text. 
163 Gongwuyuan Luyong Tijian Tongyong Biaozhun (shixing) [General 
Standards for Physical Examinations in the Employment of Civil Servants 
(provisional)], promulgated by Ministry of Personnel, Jan. 17, 2005. 







exclusively with carriers.165  It provides, in pertinent part, “Apart 
from those jobs specifically proscribed by national laws, 
administrative regulations, and regulations from the Ministry of 
Health due to ease of contagion, employers may neither refuse to 
hire, nor fire, a carrier of the hepatitis b antigen because he carries 
the antigen.”166  The regulation “strictly regulates the employer’s 
request and use of medical examinations,” permitting them only 
when there is “actual need”167 based on the exigencies of the job. 
Nor may an employer force a job applicant to take a hepatitis b 
test, except for those jobs prohibited to HBV carriers by national 
laws or administrative regulations. 168   It also calls on medical 
institutions to “protect the privacy rights of hepatitis antigen 
carriers,” suggesting that they too have a responsibility to keep this 
delicate information in the proper hands.169  Finally, the regulation 
calls on local offices of labor ministry, as well as labor arbitration 
committees, to protect the legal rights and interests of laborers in 
general, and specifically “to prevent occurrences of the 
employment discrimination issue” in hiring and employing 
workers.170  This regulation represents a targeted response to the 
problem of discrimination against HBV carriers.  By calling on 
labor arbitration committees, the regulation holds out the promise 
of implementing antidiscrimination law. 
Second, the Ministry of Labor of Social Security 
promulgated Regulations on Employment Services and 
Employment Administration, which complements the Employment 
Promotion Law in various ways.171  Chief among them are various 
                                                 
165 Guanyu Weihu Yigan Biaomian Kangyuan Xiedaizhe Jiuye Quanlide Yijian 
[Opinion on Protecting the Employment Rights of Carriers of the Hepatitis 
Surface Antigen], promulgated by the Ministry of Labor & Social Security, May 
18, 2007. 
166 Id., art. 2(1). 
167 Id., art. 2(1). 
168 Id., art. 2(2). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Jiuye Fuwu yu Jiuye Guanli Guiding [Regulations on Employment Services 
& Employment Administration], promulgated by the Ministry of Labor & Social 
Security, Nov. 5, 2007.  Article 1 notes the “regulations were formulated in 
accordance with the Employment Promotion Law . . . so as to improve 
employment service . . . foster and perfect an openly structured human resources 
market . . . and provide services for job-seekers.” Id., Art. 1.  As a regulation 
issued by the labor ministry, the Regulations would be subordinate to the 
Employment Promotion Law if there were a conflict in their provisions.  See 
 
 




prohibitions on discrimination against women, disabled persons, 
and carriers of infectious diseases. 172   Apropos of HBV, the 
Regulations for the first time prescribe a punishment for employers 
that discriminate against carriers.  If an employer requires an HBV 
test for a job not prohibited to carriers by national law or 
administrative regulation, the employer faces a fine of up to 1,000 
rmb (about $150).173   
In this way, the regulation addresses a fairly common type 
of indirect discrimination in China, as analyzed more fully in the 
following section, on the Employment Promotion Law.  Employers 
may claim that the medical examination (of which the HBV test 
forms a part) is a neutral policy designed to ensure the health of all 
applicants, but instead use the results to exclude HBV carriers.  
While a small sum for many Chinese employers, the Regulations 
are helpful in articulating a sanction, something Chinese labor law 
has tended to avoid. 
In February 2010, the Chinese government fully scrapped 
HBV testing. 174   Three ministries issued a Notice to prohibit 
employers and schools from requesting HBV testing in the medical 
examinations, requesting the results of an applicant’s HBV tests, 
and asking the applicant if he carriers the antigen.175  Medical 
institutions are likewise banned from giving schools or employers 
the results of the medical examination. 176   The Notice also 
recognizes the important privacy rights that attach to this 
information by making it for the examinee’s eyes only.177  Finally, 
sanctions are included against employers and schools that request 
HBV examinations in violation of the Notice.178 
                                                                                                             
Lifa fa, supra note 7, Art. 79. 
172 See id., Art. 16 (women), Art. 18 (disabled persons), Art. 19 (infectious 
disease carriers). 
173 Id., Art. 68. 
174  Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Ruxue he Jiuye Tijian Xiangmu Weihu Yigan 
Biaomian Kangyuan Xiedaizhe Ruxue he Jiuye Quanlide Tongzhi [Notice 
Further Regulating the Items on Physical Examinations for Education and 
Employment to Protect the Educational and Employment Rights of Hepatitis B 
Surface Antigen Carriers], promulgated by the Ministries of Education, Health, 
and Labor & Social Security, Feb. 10, 2010.  
175 Id., Art. 1. 
176 Id. 
177 Id., Art. 2.  “The hepatitis b items on the examination report should be sealed, 
only to be opened by the examinee.  No employer or individual may open 
another person's examination report.” 







IV. THE HBV SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
 The cases of Zhou Yichao and Zhang Xianzhu first raised 
the profile of HBV discrimination in 2003.  The criminal trial that 
concluded Zhou's deadly outburst, and the administrative trial that 
followed Zhang's, received national, even international, 179 
attention. The trials informed government officials, among others, 
that employment discrimination against HBV carriers could have 
deadly consequences, and that this issue required a rapid response.  
But the cases also set in motion a wider chain of events—a social 
movement—that has clamored for legal reform.  Before examining 
the various activities and channels by which HBV advocates have 
fomented for legal change, a rudimentary primer will illuminate 
the basic concepts of social movements. 
 Sociologists attend to three facets of social movements to 
explain their emergence, evolution and success (or failure). 180  
First, scholars direct attention to the political opportunities and 
constraints that confront a particular group, including changes in 
institutional structures or informal power relations. 181   This 
analysis may also include the degree of openness of the political 
system, the stability of elites that support the system, as well as the 
state’s capacity for repression. 182   In other words, one must 
appreciate the broader political context, and the internal dynamics 
that permit a movement to gain traction in a particular society. 
 Second, and inseparable from the issue of context, are the 
mobilizing structures of a movement: the collective vehicles, 
networks and organizations through which people advocate for 
change. 183   For a movement to survive and achieve success, 
however defined, activists must create organizational structures to 
                                                                                                             
sit for an HBV examination, they should timely terminate the request, correct 
the mistake, and be punished according to the Regulations on Employment 
Services and Employment Administration.” 
179 The Los Angeles Times and New York Times both covered these stories.  
See Ching-Ching Ni, The World Killer Inspires Drive Against Hepatitis Bias, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at 5 (describing both Zhou Yichao and Zhang Xianzhu 
cases); Joseph Khan, Chinese People’s Republic Is Unfair to Its Short People, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A13. 
180 See Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Introduction, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES & CULTURAL FRAMINGS 1, 2 (Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald eds., 1996).  
181 Id. at 2-3. 
182 Id. at 12. 
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sustain collective action. 184   The individual accomplishments 
people like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Susan B. Anthony are 
impressive, but neither could have succeeded without an 
organization of supporters, such as the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, or the National Women’s Rights 
Convention.  The context of rights-promotion for HBV carriers in 
China is, of course, vastly different than late nineteenth-century 
New England, or mid-century century Georgia.  But the 
importance of collective action of organizational structures runs 
throughout all social movements. 
Third, a proper analysis must account for the framing 
processes, the shared meanings through which advocates and 
affected people understand their situation.185  Social movements 
are predicated upon the tension between shared anxieties about a 
particular problem, and optimism that collective action can redress 
it.186  The framing process asks, What stories do they tell to explain 
their particular conditions?  How do they interpret events to fit 
within these dominant narratives?  To sum up, one need to account 
for the sociopolitical context in which a movement emerges, the 
organizational networks that foster the desired change, and the 
signification processes through which agents perceive the problem 
and solutions.  There is room, of course, to quibble with the lines 
between these categories,187  but they seem to constitute three vital 
acts of any social movement. 
 As noted, 2003 was “the year of antidiscrimination”188 for 
HBV carriers.  Within months of each other, the Zhou and Zhang 
cases showed how serious and widespread discrimination was, and 
that the government itself was an agent of discrimination.  The 
incidents provided a useful political opportunity around which 
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187 Anthony Oberschall, Opportunities and framing in the Eastern European 
revolts of 1989, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: 
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188 See, e.g., Cheng Gong, Fan Yigan Qishi Lu Manman [The Road against 
Hepatitis B Discrimination Is Long], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN 








antidiscrimination advocates could raise awareness of the problem 
of employment discrimination, and particularly that against carriers 
of HBV.  Two ambitious and accomplished young men sought to 
serve their government, the highest calling for aspiring youth in 
traditional China, from at least the Tang Dynasty to the present.189  
Both passed the “substantive” portions of the challenging civil 
service examination, yet another proud tradition that ensured only 
the most qualified entered government service.  Yet both were 
denied positions due to a factor they could not control, and which 
would imperil neither their ability to work, nor the health of their 
colleagues.   
 In recent years, high-profile cases such as Zhou's and 
Zhang's have catalyzed legal reform efforts, or at the very least 
symbolized larger problems that litigation aims to address.190  The 
criminal trial of Zhou Yichao, and his subsequent execution, 
aroused little public sympathy, but it did capture the attention of 
the government.  On the other hand, Zhang's decision to channel 
his disappointment through administrative litigation served more 
than his own ends, reaching hundreds of millions of people in and 
outside of China.  The court's highly technical decision did not 
vindicate Zhang,191 but it did spark a debate about the human rights 
of one of China's largest disadvantaged groups, and the function of 
courts in entrenching those rights.  At the time, Chinese courts 
manifested little sympathy to plaintiffs suing for discrimination, 
and generally avoided ascribing any kind of culpability blame to 
government actors.192  However routine, even pedestrian, the filing 
                                                 
189 See IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 75-77 (6th ed., 2000). 
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study.  Important case studies would include Yang Jia case (mental health of 
criminal defendants), the She Xianglin cases (sentencing and proof), the Deng 
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the recent murders in detention centers. 
191  The court merely found that the hospital that administered the medical 
examination wrongly concluded that Zhang was unfit to work at the Personnel 
Bureau.  Accordingly, the Bureau’s adoption of the hospital’s conclusion lacked 
a factual basis.  But the court did not order compensation for Zhang, nor order 
the Personnel Bureau to hire him.  See Zhang Xianzhu v. Wuhu Personnel 
Bureau, (Wuhu Dist. Ct., Dec. 19, 2003), in ZHOU WEI, ZHONGGUODE 
LAODONG JIUYE QISHI: FALÜ YU XIANSHI [EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN 
CHINA: LEGISLATION & REALITY] 348, 355 (2006). 
192 One much discussed case involved Jiang Tao, who sued the Chengdu branch 
of the People’s Bank of China in early 2002.  In job advertisements, the Bank 
required male applicants to be 168 centimeters (5’7”), but Jiang stood 165 
 
 




of an employment discrimination action may seem to American 
readers, Zhang's decision to litigate was by no means automatic.  
His parents firmly opposed the decision to sue.193  At that time, 
very few people had sued for employment discrimination, and 
those who did had little to show for it. 
In September 2003, Zhang’s name appeared on an online 
discussion board for HBV carriers, called gandan xiangzhao.194  
The site’s webmaster and various posters encouraged Zhang to 
take legal action to protect his rights.195  The site also served to 
connect Zhang Xianzhu with Professor Zhou Wei, of Sichuan 
University in Chengdu.196  Professor Zhou had made headlines in 
2002 by litigating one of China’s first employment discrimination 
cases, involving height discrimination.197  He wanted to expand his 
work in the field of constitutional litigation, ever hoping to, in his 
words, “marry theory and practice.” 198   He first heard about 
Zhang’s case through gandan xiangzhao, and instructed a student 
to contact Zhang through the website.199  Professor Zhou wanted 
“to fight for the basic survival rights of 120 million HBV carriers” 
and to “protect the basic rights of humanity.”200  Even at this early 
stage, the issue of employment discrimination was framed as a 
                                                                                                             
centimeters (5’6”).  With the help of his professor, Zhou Wei, Jiang sued the 
Bank, which then removed the height requirement from the advertisement.  The 
removal mooted the case.  As far as the court was concerned “Plaintiff Jiang 
Tao’s claimed rights infringement has not yet occurred, and is hence not 
litigable.”  See ZHOU WEI & LI CHENG, XIANFA PINGDENG, ZIYOU YU 
FANQISHIDE GONGYI SUSONG – ANLI, GUOCHENG YU PINGLUN [PUBLIC 
INTEREST LITIGATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY, LIBERTY & 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION – CASES, PROCESSES & CRITICISMS ] 28 (2009). 
193 See id. at 78. 
194 See Zhou Mu, “Yigan Qishi” An Kaiting: Zhou Wei Lüshi Jieshou Jizhe 
Zhuanfang [“Hepatitis B Discrimination” Case Opens: Lawyer Zhou Wei 
Accepts Exclusive Interview], CHENGDU WANBAO, Dec. 12, 2003, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-12-20/03432419602.shtml.  Meaning literally, 
“the liver and gall bladder illuminate each other,” but more figuratively, 
devotion or sincerity between two people, gandan xiangzhao was one of the first 
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basic human right to survival.201 
With Professor Zhou as his advocate, Zhang Xianzhu sued 
the Wuhu Personnel Bureau in October, 2003.  At the time, there 
was no law on point, so Professor Zhou fashioned a number of 
innovative corollaries to press the case.  For instance, Zhang’s 
complaint alleged that the Bureau’s conclusion not to hire him 
because of HBV constituted “malicious discrimination,” and “did 
not fulfill the state’s legal obligations to respect and protect human 
rights, and to treat citizens equally under the law.”202  It was, in 
other words, a violation of the right to equality enshrined in Article 
33(2) of the Chinese Constitution. 203   In subsequent filings, 
Professor Zhou analogized that Chinese laws such as the Law on 
the Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Food Safety Law, and 
regulations such as the Public Safety Hygiene Regulations 
Administrative, prohibit HBV carriers from positions in potentially 
high-risk positions like medical facilities and food production 
plants.204   But these concerns were inapposite for an office job in a 
                                                 
201 In this way, HBV advocates share similarities with rural rights resisters as 
theorized by O’Brien and Li, who define rightful resistance a “popular form of 
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support from the wider public.”  KEVIN J. O'BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL 
RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA 2 (2005).  HBV advocates use the language of the 
state – constitutional law, national law, regulations, and so on – to frame their 
struggle, such as the right to survival.  But they are quite keen on using 
authorized channels to effectuate legal change, as seen in the numerous petitions 
they have submitted to the National People's Congress.  They are also less 
concerned about exploiting the central-rural divide.  For the most part, HBV 
advocates are comparatively wealthy, well educated, and more internet-savvy 
than rural resisters.  Moreover, rightful resisters occasionally agitate quite 
demonstrably (tearing up ballots, grabbing microphones to denounce local 
officials), and repose trust in the central government at the expense of local 
officials.  Id., at 56-7.  HBV advocates may demonstrate publicly, but not in a 
confrontational way.  Nor is there an implicit trust in the central government 
over local governments.  Id., at 42-3. 
202 See Administrative Complaint, in Zhou, supra note 157, at 326, 327. 
203 Id. at 327. 
204  For instance, the Food Safety Law, Law on Prevention of Infectious 
Diseases, Administrative Provisions on Public Hygiene, and Implementing 
Regulations for the Administrative Provisions on Public Hygiene all place 
various restrictions on HBV carriers in fields such as food production, water 
provision, child care, and even beauty salons.  See Statement of First Instance, 
id. at 329, 333. But the position Zhang applied for involved economic 
administration in the county affairs office, and was unlikely to involve the kind 
 
 





The court ruled that the hospital—not a party to the 
lawsuit—had erred in concluding Zhang was unfit for the position.  
Anhui Province’s Provisional Implementing Regulations for the 
Physical Examination of National Civil Servants disqualified 
actively infected carriers of HBV, but not passive carriers like 
Zhang. 206   Moreover, the hospital exceeded its jurisdiction in 
ruling on Zhang’s suitability, which properly belonged to the 
Personnel Bureau.  Since the recruitment cycle ended with the 
second-placed candidate filling the post, the court found it could 
order no remedy.207  Zhang had won a symbolic victory on a very 
minute point of law, and his case made headlines all over China.208  
But he left the courthouse as unemployed as when he entered it.209 
 Zhang's lawsuit was itself an event, an opportunity to call 
attention to the larger issue of discrimination against HBV carriers.  
Advocates informed the media about Zhang’s case, ensuring that 
dozens of journalists attended the hearings, and reported on the 
announcement of the verdict.210  Members of the online support 
group gandan xiangzhao also attended the hearings, both to show 
support for Zhang, and to increase visibility for their cause.  Press 
reports about a figure as sympathetic as Zhang opened up 
discussions, and allayed people's fears about working alongside 
HBV carriers.211 
                                                                                                             
of direct human contact that would conceivable make an HBV carrier 
“undesirable.” Id. at 333. 
205 See Administrative Complaint, id. at 355. 
206 See Statement of First Instance,  Id. at 333. 
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208 See ZHOU & LI, supra note 174, at 76 (listing the newspaper articles covering 
the case, such as People’s Daily, Xinhua, CCTV, Southern Weekend, and 
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209 Zhang has not had any easy time finding work.  He was let go from a job in a 
Guangzhou factory after his boss recognized him from the lawsuit.  He also 
taught at an elementary school in Guizhou.  He has received offers from 
hospitals and pharmaceutical companies to serve as a spokesperson, but worried 
that such positions would “be equal to selling my own soul.” See generally 
Huang Maowang, Zhang Xianzhu: Yigan Zhidu Qishi Yin Ta Zhibu [Zhang 
Xianzhu: Systemic Discrimination against Hepatitis B Stopped Because of Him], 
FAZHI ZHOUBAO [LEGAL WEEKLY], Aug. 29, 2008, at 
http://www.dffy.com/sifashijian/jj/ 200808/20080829151838.htm.. 
210 See ZHOU & LI, supra note 174, at 78-9 (noting that fifty journalists attended 
the December 19, 2003 hearing, and over thirty journalists, from all over the 
country, attended the verdict on April 2, 2004). 







 The gandan xiangzhao website quickly gained a large 
following among HBV carriers and others.212   An international 
domain name since 2001, the site had attracted 85,000 registered 
members by December 2004,213  where it served as a sounding 
board for the frustration of carriers and their experiences in 
education, employment, housing, public services, and other fields.  
The ability to communicate openly, freely, and honestly about this 
topic brought together a large community of HBV advocates.  
They had neither discussed the issue publicly, nor publicly 
identified themselves as a group in need of legal protection. 
The website also functioned as a collective action center.  
On August 13, 2003, advocates posted a proposal on the site, 
asking the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress (the 
highest legislative body) to review the constitutionality of the 
provincial regulations on civil servant examinations.214  Over 1,600 
Chinese citizens signed the petition before sending it to the 
Standing Committee in November 2003.215  The petition warned of 
“dozens, even hundreds, of Zhou Yichaos” in the future if the 
government did not attend to this “serious social problem.” 216  
                                                                                                             
Yiren Weiquan [Ways of Curing Infectious Diseases: Zhang Xianzhu Protects 
the Rights of 120 Million], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Apr. 13, 2005, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/28320/41246/41339/3316310.html. 
212 Some of the plaintiffs analyzed in section V of this article also used the 
gandan site for legal and moral support.  Plaintiffs 3 and 21, among others, used 
the site.  See infra, Appendix at Sources, 3, 21. 
213 See “In the hepatitis B camp” Website: Home of hepatitis B carriers in 
China, http://www.hbvhbv.com/ english. 
214 See Zhanyou Daqianming Faqi “Weixian Shenchashu” [Droves of Netizens 
Sign “Review of Constitutionality”], Jan, 24, 2005, XINLANG DUSHU [NEW 
WAVE READER],  http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/ book/chapter_38316_20253.html; 
“Gandan Xiangzhao” Chong ran Shengming Xiwang [“Gandan Xiangzhao” 
Again Raises Hope for Life], Sept. 17, 2005, YANGCHENG WANBAO 
[YANGCHENG EVENING NEWS], http://ycwb/com/gb/content 2005-
09/17/content_985681.htm. 
215 A copy of the petition appears on the gandan xiangzhao website.  See 1611 
wei Gongming Yaoqiu dui Zhongguo 31 sheng Gonwuyuan Luyong Xianzhi 
Yigan Xiedaizhe Guiding Jinxing Weixian Shengcha he Jiaqiang Yigan 
Xiedaixhe Lifa Baohude Jianyishu [A Petition by 1,611 Citizens to Demand 
Review of the Constitutionality of China’s 31 Provinces’ Regulations Limiting 
the Hire of Civil Servants with the Hepatitis B Virus, and to Strengthen the 
Legal Protection of Hepatitis B Virus Carriers], http://www. 
Hbvhbv.com/forum/thread-298433-1-963.html (hereinafter, “Petition”). 
216 See Petition, supra note 196, at II(8). 
 
 




Invoking domestic laws and international human rights law,217 the 
petition urged “the Chinese State and Central People’s 
Government to honor their solemn commitment to the people of 
the world, and ensure the collective right to exist of 120 million 
people.   If we improve the living conditions of 120 million people, 
this would be China’s contribution to all of humanity.”218   
The petition contained a number of proposals, some of 
which have since been adopted.  First and foremost, the petition 
called on the State Council to remove HBV from the list of 
disqualifying diseases on the civil service examinations,219 a task 
realized gradually by regulations issued in 2007 and 2010. 220  
Other proposal included the protection of privacy rights for HBV 
carriers,221 subsequently crystallized in the 2010 Notice discussed 
above.222  Perhaps most important, this petition has served as a 
template for subsequent requests made to government bodies.  Lu 
Jun, one of China’s leading HBV advocates, has called on 
government bodies to pas various types of protective legislation 
and regulation.223  HBV advocates continue to petition the National 
People's Congress, the Supreme People's Court, and various 
ministries to enhance the protections of HBV carriers and 
disadvantaged people more generally.224   
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People's Congress and the Political Consultative Committee in 2005, 2006 and 
2007), http://focus.news.163.com/10/0427/18/659VUC2900011SM9.html. 
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“Employment Promotion Law”] (on file with author).  The petition was sent to 
the Supreme People’s Court in early 2010.  See also Waidi Canjiren ye Xiang 
Guangzhoushi Gongjiao Youhui [Non-resident Disabled People Also Enjoy 
Transportation Benefits from Guangzhou City], YANGCHENG WANBAO, May 16, 







 Upon the success of the gandan xiangzhao website, 
advocates established other websites and organizations to agitate 
on behalf of HBV carriers.  For instance, hbver.com includes a 
message board, news articles about HBV, information about 
cirrhosis of the liver, and links to medicines and prevention 
methods.225 Another site, ganbaobao.com, has a special section on 
rights protection, with articles on the prevalence of discrimination, 
news about various lawsuits, and advice on how to handle rights 
infringements.226   Another legally oriented site is fanqishi.com, 
which links to articles on laws and lawsuits involving various 
forms of discrimination.227  These sites continue to play the role of 
informant and sounding board for HBV carriers, allowing people 
from all over China (and the world) to partake in the discussion.  In 
addition, specialized organizations have sprung up to raise 
awareness, educate citizens, litigate cases and petition government 
bodies to enhance protections.  The most successful of these 
organizations is probably Yirenping, which litigates cases, surveys 
employer attitudes, publishes a bimonthly newsletter with recent 
developments and submits petitions to government bodies on 
behalf of HBV carriers.228 
In society more generally, for the first time, a wider 
discussion of discrimination took place online, both on hepatitis b 
websites, and on state-run news agencies, such as CCTV.  They 
debated public safety concerns, legal issues such as the rights to 
equal employment and privacy, and other matters related to 
hepatitis b.229  Until this time, most members of the Chinese public 
had not even mentioned HBV, much less discussed the problems 
of those who carried it.  HBV had come out of the closet, and onto 
the tongues and screens of millions of Chinese.  Significant media 
                                                                                                             
Guangzhou Transportation Commission requesting preferential services on 
Guangzhou public transit). 
225  See Zhansheng Yigan (Fighting for Victory), 
http://www.hbver.com/Index.html. 
226 See Ganbaobao (Precious Liver), http://www.ganbaobao.com.cn.  The section 
on “rights protection by friends of the liver” (ganyou weiquan) appears in the 
lower right hand section of the front page. 
227 See generally http://www.fanqishi.com. 
228See generally http://www.yirenping.org. 
229  See, e.g., Xiaochu Yigan Qishi [Eliminating Hepatitis Discrimination], 
CCTV, Feb. 18, 2004 (transcribing an interview between a CCTV reporter and 








attention helped mobilizing structures keep the issue on the public 
radar. 
 Finally, there is the issue of signification processes.  How 
do HBV advocates understand the struggle in which they engage?  
What language or discourse do they use to frame the debate 
between carriers and the employers who seek to avoid them?  One 
common encapsulation of the issue is the “right to equal 
employment” or “the right to survival.”  As a socialist country with 
a long history of state-sponsored employment, China privileges 
social and economic rights (such as food, education, social welfare, 
employment), over civil and political ones.230  In complaints to 
courts of law, signs brandished during demonstrations, and 
interviews with journalists and others, the issue is framed in 
socioeconomic terms.  For example, advocates carry signs that 
state “Eliminate Hepatitis B Discrimination—Construct a 
Harmonious Society,” or “Eliminate Hepatitis B Discrimination—
Promote Equal Employment,” or even “It Is Not Easy to Deprive 
120 Million HBV Antigen Carriers of the Right to Survive.”231  By 
framing the issue in terms used by the government itself – such as 
“harmonious society” – the movement aligns itself with 
government interests, and avoids appearing confrontational or 
oppositional.  Instead, they present their cause as one of necessity 
and equality, of the right to a job.  No one is asking for charity, or 
a politically sensitive privilege such as the right to vote.  Instead, 
advocates insist that HBV carriers simply want to work, to 
contribute to society, and to live.  No official could cavil with such 
a platform of demands.232 
 By raising public awareness, petitioning for legal reform, 
and mobilizing media support for their cause, activists have made 
HBV discrimination one of Chna’s leading equality issues.  Their 
actions have helped crease a legal edifice under which they can 
assert rights, and perhaps change employer behavior.  The success 
of their assertion of rights is taken up in the final section.   
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V. EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION LAW 
 The Employment Promotion Law of 2007 would have 
helped HBV carriers such as Zhang Xianzhu and Zhou Yichao.233  
Drafting began in late 2003,234 perhaps spurred by these incidents 
and the public outcry.  Initially, however, the drafters were mainly 
focused on irregularities in China’s labor market, and sought to 
rectify them through training programs, regulating employment 
agencies, and boosting investment in employment services. 235  
There was particular concern about the oversaturation of labor in 
industries like manufacturing, and the lack of technical expertise in 
others, such as high-tech fields.236 
While these issues were the primary concerns of the 
National People’s Congress (“NPC”), public comment on an early 
draft brought to light a topic not then on the agenda.  The NPC’s 
General Office of Standing Committee posted a draft of the 
Employment Promotion Law (“EPL”) on its website from March 
25 to April 25, 2007.  During this period, it received over 11,000 
opinions from the general public, 7,000 of which concerned 
discrimination in employment.237  People recounted their personal 
experiences with discrimination in many forms, including sex, age, 
appearance, and disability.238  Public opposition to discrimination 
against hepatitis b carriers was particularly acute.239  Based on this 
response, the NPC’s Legal Affairs Commission introduced an 
entirely new chapter into the law: chapter 3, “Equal Employment,” 
systematized the smattering of protections interspersed throughout 
the earlier draft, and expanded protections to five groups of 
disadvantaged people.240  This represents an important intervention 
                                                 
233 Article 30 covers infectious disease carriers.  But Jiang Tao would not have 
been covered, since the law does not cover height discrimination. 
234 See China Hopes to Promote Justice in Employment by New Law, XINHUA 
NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 11, 2007, at 
http://www.chinagate.cn/english/social/50373.htm. 
235 Id. 
236 Tian Chengping, Guanyu “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye Cujin Fa 
(Caoan)” de Shuoming [Explanation of the PRC Employment Promotion Law 
(Draft)], in Xin, supra note 19, at 219, 220. 
237 Liu Bohong, Jiang Xingbie Pingdeng Naru Lifa Guocheng [Incorporating 
Gender Equality into the Process of Making Legislation] (unpublished 
document, on file with author). 
238 See Xin, supra note 19, at 65. 
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in the drafting of Chinese law.  Since 2005, the NPC has posted 
draft laws on the internet to solicit feedback from concerned 
citizens and interest groups. 241   The experience with the EPL 
shows that public opinion—when directed at the right target and 
conveyed through the proper channels—can have an enormous 
impact on the final form the law takes. 
 Since entering into effect on January 1, 2008, the EPL has 
generated a large number of lawsuits challenging a few types of 
employment discrimination.  Unlike previous guarantees of 
equality in employment, found in such laws as the Labor Law or 
Women’s Law, the EPL grants access to People’s Courts, an 
invitation that many discrimination victims have taken up.242  After 
discussing the relevant provisions, we then discuss several 
representative lawsuit brought under the EPL.  Finally, this section 
offers a number of ways to improve the implementation of this 
law. 
 
A.  Provisions 
 The third chapter of the EPL guarantees equal employment.  
It provides the most robust set of protections against employment 
discrimination, and probably any kind of discrimination, in 
contemporary Chinese law.  Since it grants victims of 
discrimination access to courts, it overcomes a common critique of 
Chinese law—that it lacks implementability (kecaozuoxing). 
The EPL contains a general proscription of employment 
discrimination, mirroring language found in the Labor Law and 
Labor Contract Law. 243   More important, it provides specific 
                                                                                                             
Committee on the Situation of Revising the “PRC Employment Promotion Law 
(Draft)], in Xin, supra note 22, at 226, 227.  An earlier version of the law 
included age as another prohibited category, but this was apparently excised in 
subsequent decisions.  See Jiuye Cujin Fa Caoan: Jianli Pingdeng Jiuye Jinzhi 
Xingbie Qishi [Employment Promotion Law Draft: Establishing Equal 
Employment, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination ], CHINA NEWS, Feb. 26, 2007, 
available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200702/26/235907.shtml. 
241  See NPC Invites Public’s Comments on Draft Employment Law, CHINA 
DAILY, Mar. 27, 2007 (noting that the NPC publicized the draft Property Law in 
2005, and the draft Labor Contract Law in 2006). 
242 Article 62 grants victims of discrimination access to court.  Jiuye cujin fa 
[Employment Promotion Law], promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Aug. 30, 2007. 
243 Article 4 echoes Article 12 of the Labor Law, by providing “shall have the 
right to equal employment and to select their own jobs in accordance with the 







prohibitions against five disadvantaged groups: women, ethnic 
minorities, disabled persons, people with infectious diseases, and 
rural workers.244  Unlike U.S. federal law, or China’s Labor Law, 
which simply list bases on which it is illegal to discriminate, the 
EPL grants differential levels of protection to each group, both to 
adapt to the existing legal framework, and to address problems 
unique to each group.  This means, in effect, that the law offers 
different levels of protections to each group. 
Three provisions in particular—on women, infectious 
disease carriers and rural residents—are germane to the present 
discussion.  Article 27 provides 
The state ensures that women have labor rights 
equal to those of men.   
 
When an employer hires personnel, it may not 
refuse to employ a woman on the basis of her sex, 
except for jobs or positions that the state has 
specified as being unsuitable to women, or set 
standards for the employment of women that are 
higher than those for men.  
 
When an employer employs a female employee, it 
may not include provisions in her employment 
contract that place restrictions on her getting 
married, having children, etc.245 
 
The first sentence—that the state ensures equal labor rights 
between men and women—showcases the state’s concern for the 
equal rights of women.  The law does not impose a similar 
symmetry for infectious disease carriers (that they shall be treated 
equally as non-disease carriers) or rural residents (that they shall be 
treated equally as urban residents).  The rhetorical space given to 
women remains high, as it has for most of the PRC’s history. 
Nevertheless, scholars have criticized the Employment 
Promotion Law for including the exception for jobs deemed 
“unsuitable to women.”  This may encourage employers to classify 
jobs as “unsuitable” for women based on stereotyped or outdated 
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notions of women’s capacities.  This may further segregate the 
workforce, possibly pushing women into low-paying jobs.246   
An additional concern involves the use of the word “hire” 
in section 2 (zhaoyong) and “employ” (luyong) in section 3.  
Women face discrimination in various phases and aspects of their 
jobs, from hiring to retirement, promotion and pregnancy leave, 
wages and sexual harassment.  By using the word “hire,” the law 
limits the scope of the law to the period before she becomes an 
employee.  But many forms of discrimination do not surface until 
one is on the job.  Though the word “employ” in paragraph 3 
would seem to dispense with these concerns, that paragraph only 
covers terms that appear in the “employment contract.”  An 
employer is unlikely to indicate that he will sexually harass a 
female employee in the terms of the employment contract.  In 
short, the law does not protect women in promotion, training, titles, 
termination, and other phases of employment, as similar laws do in 
Japan247 and the United States.248 
The Employment Promotion Law also safeguards the rights 
of carriers of infectious disease.  Article 30 provides 
When hiring personnel, an employer may not refuse 
to employ someone on the grounds that he or she is 
a carrier of an infectious disease.  However, a 
certified carrier of an infectious disease may not, 
until he or she has recovered, or the suspicion of 
infectiousness has been eliminated, engage in work 
prohibited by laws, administrative statutes or the 
State Council’s health authority, due to the fact that 
it would facilitate the spread of the disease.249 
 
Again, one could argue that the specification of prohibited jobs 
may reinforce the notion that disease carriers should be excluded 
from the workplace.  However, by requiring employers to base 
their judgments on a certification that the person carries a disease, 
the role of suspicion and misinformation, which occasionally 
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trump sound medical reasoning, will be minimized.250  As we shall 
see in Part V, this is the most actively litigated provision of the 
EPL. 
Finally, the EPL protects the rights of migrant workers,251 
by providing “Rural workers employed in cities shall enjoy labor 
rights equal to those of urban workers.  No discriminatory 
restrictions may be set against rural workers seeking employment 
in cities.” 252   While this provision addresses a key problem 
discussed above—the plethora of discriminatory restrictions that 
cities have imposed against migrant workers—it is not clear how to 
implement it.  First, and unlike the above provisions on women 
and carriers of infectious diseases, this article says neither “the 
state protects the rights of rural workers,” nor that “employers may 
not refuse to employ someone on the grounds of their” rural status.  
It thus offers a lower level of protection to rural residents than it 
does to women.   
Second, if a migrant worker were to bring a lawsuit based, 
for instance, on a city regulation that favors hiring local residents, 
against whom would he file the case?  The employer who did not 
hire him could simply point to the municipal agency that 
promulgated the discriminatory regulation.  But the agency did not 
cause the harm – the employer refused to hire the plaintiff.  Just as 
in the Zhang Xianzhu case, a court could find that the municipal 
agency exceeded its jurisdictional limits, or the agency’s actions 
lacked a factual basis, but deem itself powerless to devise a 
remedy.  Nor is a court likely to force an agency to rescind a 
regulation, as courts lack the power of judicial review.  Of course, 
until a migrant worker brings a lawsuit challenging discrimination 
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under the EPL, we will have to wait to see how a court enforces 
this provision as a practical matter. 
 
B.  Cases 
 Plaintiffs all over China have filed lawsuits under the EPL.  
The twenty-five lawsuits found and analyzed by this author took 
place all over China: Beijing and Shanghai, Xinjiang and Guangxi, 
Zhengzhou and Shenzhen, and many other places.253  This in itself 
deserves reflection, suggesting that plaintiffs trust courts to entrust 
them with the adjudication of cases involving basic human 
rights.254  The overwhelming majority of suits—22 of the 25—
come from HBV carriers, signaling both the strength and 
limitations of the EPL.255  Of the 19 fully adjudicated cases, 15 
involved compensating the plaintiff, while the court ruled for the 
defendant in 4 cases.256  Many plaintiffs are young and college-
educated, and the lawsuit involves their first job. 
It is important to note that, to date, no plaintiff has filed a 
lawsuit under the EPL for discrimination due to gender, disability, 
ethnicity or rural status.  In addition, the foregoing analysis is 
limited to lawsuits that appeared in the Chinese media, and a small 
number of verdicts that the author obtained through contacting 
human rights lawyers in China.  Because it is difficult to evaluate a 
judge’s reasoning based on a small sample of media reports, the 
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analysis is necessarily limited.  Still, basic similarities across many 
cases offer the contours of the typical case. 
HBV lawsuits follow a pattern, roughly analogous to Zhang 
Xianzhu’s.257  Plaintiff passes the written and oral examinations of 
his prospective employer, who then makes a job offer, or a 
conditional job offer upon passing a medical examination.  When 
the applicant’s medical examination reveals he carries HBV, the 
employer either rejects the application, or rescinds the offer.  After 
an attempt at mediation, the applicant will sue in court (avoiding 
labor arbitration) for economic damages, emotional distress 
damages, or breach of contract.  He or she may also request an 
apology. 
Chinese courts have some discretion in deciding whether to 
accept cases.  Some courts refuse to accept cases of discrimination 
in hiring because it is not listed in the Supreme People’s Court 
causes of action. 258   Nevertheless, many judges have accepted 
these cases, interpreting the disputes as implicating the right to 
health or the right to privacy. 259   The first hurdle for many 
plaintiffs, then, is to find a judge or court willing to hear the case. 
Judges also enjoy discretion in assessing damages from 
emotional distress.260  Based on the limited number of verdicts I 
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2008.  
259 The Regulations cover personality rights in article 1, the right to privacy in 
article 6, and various labor rights in articles 163-6. See id.   
260  See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Qinquan Jingshen 
Sunhai Peichangren Ruogan Wentide Jieshi [Supreme People’s Court 
Interpretation of Several Issues in Determining the Duty to Compensate for the 
Tort of Emotional Distress], promulgated Mar. 8, 2001, effective Mar. 10, 
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have looked at, emotional distress seems to be main damage for 
which judges order compensation.261  Two cases bear this out.  In 
the first case, Plaintiff passed employer Defendant’s oral and 
written examinations during his final year of college, in December, 
2006.262  He then signed an employment agreement (jiuye xieyi), 
and stopped his job search in reliance thereupon.263  But in June 
2007, the employer informed plaintiff he would need to complete a 
liver examination, which revealed he carried HBV.  The employer 
then refused to hire him because he carried HBV.  Indeed, Ms. 
Yang of the company’s human resources department specifically 
stated this as the reason, during a conversation that Plaintiff 
actually taped, and produced as evidence.264 
Plaintiff sued for both breach of contract and tort, that is, 
the company’s refusal to hire him violated his right to equal 
employment and caused emotional distress.  The court agreed with 
both theories, but interpreted his suit as a tort claim.  It then 
ordered defendant to pay 10,000 renminbi (of the 50,000 plaintiff 
requested) in compensation for emotional distress, citing among 
other things the “the economic capacity of the defendant, and the 
lost work time of the Plaintiff.”265  An appellate court upheld this 
ruling after Defendant appealed.266 
In a second case, brought against the Dazhong News Group 
in Shandong, Plaintiff passed the written and oral examinations, as 
well as a second-round test.267  Defendant then sent an email with a 
job offer, but conditioned it upon passing a medical 
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examination.268  The examination results revealed that she carried 
HBV, but that her liver functioned normally.269  Defendant still 
refused to sign a contract.270  Plaintiff sued for the breach of her 
right to equal employment, and appended claims for emotional 
distress and economic damages, as well as an apology.271   
The court found defendant’s rejection “caused Plaintiff 
enormous psychological pressure and emotional pain.  In light of 
such factors as the extent of Defendant’s culpability, the 
consequences wrought by the tort, and the economic capacity for 
which the tortfeasor is responsible, this court comprehensively 
recognizes Plaintiff’s demand for compensation for emotional 
distress.”272  It awarded her 15,000 of the 50,000 renminbi she 
sought in emotional distress damages.273  She also requested half a 
year’s wages in economic damages, or 12,894 rmb, to make up for 
the time lost between Defendant’s refusal to hire her, and her filing 
the lawsuit. 274    The court awarded a fraction of the damages 
sought—1,000 rmb—in light of her “work and life 
circumstances.”275  Finally, the court also ordered Defendant to 
issue a public apology—to be authorized by the court—within 
thirty days of the issuance of the judgment.276 
The above cases suggest the broad contours of HBV 
litigation.  The key to success in these lawsuits—as in 
discrimination cases in the United State—is the adduction of proof.  
Unlike American litigants, Chinese plaintiffs cannot shift the 
burden of proof to defendants in discrimination cases; they must 
produce all the necessary documentation themselves.  Lucky for 
carriers of HBV, there is a long paper trail that suggests 
discrimination, something comparatively rare in discrimination 
cases.  These documents provide the evidentiary basis that judges 
need to determine that defendant discriminated.277  Plaintiffs may 
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produce notices from the employer that they passed the written and 
oral examinations, copies of job offers (or conditional job offers), 
and other indicia that they qualified for the position.  They may 
also have the employer’s request to sit for a medical examination, 
as well as the results of that exam: that they carry HBV.  Finally, a 
written rejection, conversation or phone call (sometimes recorded) 
encapsulates the rejection.  Judges have a solid foundation upon 
which to make a finding of discrimination.  
But a long paper trail will not arise under most other kinds 
of discrimination.  Take gender discrimination.  Women can be 
screened out much earlier in the process, often by explicit 
requirements in the job advertisement.  Likewise, a resume may 
also reveal the applicant's gender, either because of her given 
name, or the photograph often accompanying the application 
packet.   If there is still doubt, a phone call can ferret out female 
applicants.  And when that fails, one can simply interview the 
female candidate and turn her down afterward without generating 
any indicia of discrimination.  With the exception of the explicit 
job advertisement, 278  none of these techniques would produce 
documentation, leaving a judge to rule essentially on plaintiff’s 
allegations, suspicions, and interpretations.  Even if the defendant 
made a plainly discriminatory statement during the interview, or 
injected it obliquely by asking about boyfriends and children, the 
case would still hinge on hearsay: her statements about what he 
said out of court, and his statements about what he said out of 
court.  This presents a dilemma for the presiding judge. 
So while perhaps disappointing, is not entirely surprising 
that no woman has filed a lawsuit based on gender discrimination 
in hiring. 279   There are various explanations for this absence, 
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including the lack of evidence noted above.  Some women just 
accept the prevalence of sex discrimination, adopting an attitude of 
anger, resignation, and silence, the latter perceived as the most 
effective of the “reasonable alternatives.” 280    Others are too 
concerned with finding a job, lacking the time and resources 
needed to prosecute a lawsuit.281  As one interviewee put it, “Even 
if I won the case, what kind of result would I get?  Is the employer 
going to hire me?  If a company didn’t want to hire you, but you 
get the job [after litigation], they are not going to make it easy for 
you.”282  Particularly in light of the success of various hepatitis b 
cases, the absence of sex discrimination lawsuits calls into question 
the efficacy of the EPL as a tool to combat employment 
discrimination. 
 
C.  Problems 
 For all of its important advances, the Employment 
Promotion Law omits a few basic things.  These gaps could be 
further elaborated through subsequent legislation, provincial 
legislation, implementing guidelines, administrative regulations, or 
judicial interpretations.  This section offers some suggestions to 
heighten the efficacy of China's antidiscrimination laws generally, 
and the EPL in particular. 
 First, the EPL does not define discrimination.  This may 
seem a formality, but the concept of discrimination is not widely 
known in China, including among judges. 283   Consequently, 
formalities like a clear definition of discrimination can make a big 
difference to the presiding judge. 
 Second, it does not cover a wide range of discrimination 
quite common in contemporary China.  Age, appearance, and 
                                                                                                             
Suzhe Falü [After Encountering Discrimination, Why Have We Not Seen Women 
Appeal to the Law?], XINJINGBAO [NEW CAPITAL NEWS], June 15, 2009 (noting 
that, as of June 15, 2009, not a single case of gender discrimination in hiring had 
been filed).  I note that recent searches on Google and Baidu revealed no 
discrimination cases brought by women (last checked May 31, 2010). 
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height are routine bases for refusing to hire someone, though they 
have almost no bearing on the ability to perform.  To be sure, it is 
unreasonable to expect antidiscrimination law to respond perfectly 
to contemporary conditions ab initio, particularly given the slow 
and gradual approach of Chinese legal reform, where minor and 
incremental change is preferred to cataclysms.  Moreover, as 
experience in other countries show, protected classes tend to 
proliferate over time; in a few years, it is likely that a new group, 
currently unrecognized, may clamor for their rights more loudly or 
persuasively.284   For example, during the drafting of the EPL, a 
number of public commentators pointed out the prevalence of age 
discrimination.285  The decision not to include age discrimination 
may be tied to the prevalence of the differential retirement age for 
men and women, which has been a heated source of debate in 
recent years.286 
Third, the protections offered are not as robust as they 
could be.  We have already seen the widespread discrimination in 
job advertisements.  The same could be said for job interviews, 
where asking women personal questions about marriage and 
childbirth plans are routine.  Indeed, some employers still require 
women to forego marriage and pregnancy as a condition of their 
employment, placing such stipulations in their job contracts.  A 
legal prohibition on gender restrictions in print and online 
advertisements would be a good first step, followed by the 
proscription of personal questions (marital status, boyfriends, 
children) in the interview. 
 Fourth, the law does not address the evidentiary issues that 
                                                 
284 The United States first protected race, sex and national origin in the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, age in the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
disability in the 1990 Americans with Disability Act. Congress is presently 
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285 See Xin, supra note 19, at 65. 
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6, 2009, http://www.npc. Gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Events/2009-
04/06/content_1496720.htm (noting that Ms. Chen, a senior legislator in the 
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particularly for those who have doctorates or master’s degrees”); Nüganbu 
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Candidates Removed], BEIJING NEWS, May 5, 2005, 
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typically emerge in employment discrimination lawsuits.  In the 
U.S., plaintiffs frequently struggle to adduce evidence of 
discrimination, which is almost exclusively within the defendant's 
possession.  The Supreme Court responded to this lacuna by 
articulating the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting mechanism: 
after plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of employment 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision; if defendant meets that 
burden, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to prove why the 
defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual.287  To be sure, burden-
shifting has attracted its own set of critics.288  But it has leveled the 
evidentiary playing field between defendants, who are loath to turn 
over information behind their employment decisions, and 
plaintiffs, who must rely on stray comments or other circumstantial 
evidence to prove their case.   
 Fifth, the law does not address the question of legal 
liability, and remedies in particular, with sufficient specificity.289  
Suppose the plaintiff proves that her job application was turned 
down for a discriminatory reason.  What should her redress be?  
Does she get the job?  The next available one?  Should she receive 
another form of injunctive relief?  And what about the employer?  
What remedial or punitive measures should courts levy against 
discriminating employers?  Some scholars have suggested, for 
instance, that employers should have to withdraw discriminatory 
advertisements, or else lose the ability to advertise altogether.290     
                                                 
287 McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
288  See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Employment Discrimination: Moving 
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289 Zhou Huyong, Jiuye Qishi Susong Jiuji Tixi de Goujian [Components of a 
Redress System for Employment Discrimination Litigation], 23 BEIJINGSHI 
GONGHUI GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO 42, 42 [JOURNAL OF BEIJING FEDERATION 
OF TRADE UNIONS CADRE COLLEGE]  (2008). 
290 Zhang Huagui & Guo Yiyi, Lun Jiuye Xingbie Qishide Falü Guizhi: Jianping 
“Jiuye Cujin Fa” zhi Xiangguan Guiding [On Legal Regulations of Sex 
Discrimination in Employment: A Critique of the Relevant Provisions in the 
 
 




As for punitive measures, these scholars recommend a basket of 
sanctions including (1) civil liability, to cover economic losses and 
emotional distress damages to plaintiff; (2) administrative liability, 
such as a fine from the employer to the relevant enforcement 
agency (once established); and even (3) criminal liability.291  These 
alternative forms of liability could take the form of implementing 
legislation by the Ministry of Labor and Social Services, or a 
judicial interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court. 
The EPL could have taken a page from the 2007 Labor 
Contract Law,292 section VII of which lays out various situations a 
judge may face in presiding over a case.  A judge thus knows what 
to do if, for example, an employer fails to set out mandatory 
clauses in the labor contract,293 retains the employee’s ID card or 
seizes his property,294 does not certify the termination of a labor 
contract,295 and so on.  Since the EPL does not speak at this level 
of granularity, additional regulations by other government organs 
are needed. 
 Sixth, a problem as widespread as employment 
discrimination requires the coordinated efforts of courts, labor 
bureaus, local people’s congresses, and other official actors.  The 
EPL tasks certain government organs with eliminating 
discrimination, but only in vague terms.  For instance, Article 25 
provides “People’s Governments at every level shall create a fair 
employment environment, eliminate discrimination in 
                                                                                                             
“Employment Promotion Law”], 167 FAZHI YU JINGJI 33, 34 [LAW & 
ECONOMICS] (2008).  The authors suggest that discriminating employers should 
bear both remedial (buchangxing) responsibility and punitive (zhengfaxing) 
responsibility.  The former would permit the appropriate government agency to 
make employers withdraw discriminatory requirements, such as “men only” or 
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plaintiff whole.  See id. at 34. 
291 Id. at 34.  Criminal liability, which would require revision of the criminal 
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of racial discrimination. See generally Julie C. Suk, Equal by Comparison: 
Unsettling Assumptions about Discrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 302-303, 
309-311 (2006) (describing French criminal sanctions for discrimination, and 
the history of sanctions  on discriminatory speech in particular). 
292  Laodong Hetong Fa [Labor Contract Law] promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008. 
293 Id., Art. 81. 
294 Id., Art. 84. 







employment, formulate policies and take measures to support and 
assist the hard-to-employ.” 296   But local governments are busy 
entities, more concerned with creating jobs than assisting those 
who have been refused.  Given their mandate to increase GDP and 
economic growth, local governments may hesitate to formulate 
such a policy, particularly if it might antagonize employers who 
practice employment discrimination.  
Likewise, article 60 provides “Labor administration 
authorities shall supervise and inspect the implementation of this 
Law, establish a reporting system, accept reports of violations of 
this Law and promptly verify and handle the same.”  This is more 
specific, but to date no labor bureau has set up the reporting system 
noted herein.  Such a body is certainly necessary, however, and 
could handle cases, monitor job advertisements, and investigate 
employers against whom charges have been directed – similar to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the United 
States.  As it stands now, many forms of employment 
discrimination go unpunished, while job advertisements help to 




 Employment discrimination is now firmly imprinted in the 
national psyche of the PRC.  Famous cases have captured 
headlines and public attention.  NGOs dedicated to various causes 
have been formed, raising awareness, bringing cases, conducting 
research, and even training employers about the problems of 
discrimination.  Consensus has formed that discrimination—
though widespread—is wrong.  The national government has taken 
its strongest stance toward ensuring equal employment through the 
passage of the Employment Promotion Law in 2007.  Plaintiffs 
have won a handful of well-publicized cases, suggesting that courts 
have taken a favorable view of the law, the media has the 
government’s blessing to report such events, and the long-
discussed implementation deficit of Chinese law is shrinking, 
slightly. 
If the Chinese government continues to push forward these 
reforms, it will first have to revise or annul a bevy of 
discriminatory legislation.  This could be piecemeal, continuing the 
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recent trend of revising such laws and regulations, or through an 
all-encompassing law, such as an Anti-Discrimination Law.  But it 
will also have to chart new grounds, further elaborating evidentiary 
issues that the Employment Promotion Law does not address, 
reviewing the publication of discriminatory advertisements, 
explaining what kinds of remedies are available to successful 
plaintiffs, and perhaps even establishing a body to monitor 
employment discrimination, such as the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.  This short history of employment 
discrimination in China shows that, like dozens of other countries 
that have devoted government and judicial resources to preventing 
discrimination, the process of proscription is always a work in 
progress.  China has taken the first steps down the righteous path, 
or up the slippery slope, of prohibiting discrimination.  
Presumably, popular support for such initiatives will continue. 
Finally, this paper clarifies that Chinese citizens, with the 
assistance of civil society groups and online technologies, can 
effectuate legal change in a gradual, small-scale way, on a discrete 
legal issue.  How well this lesson can be applied to other potential 
areas of legal reform remains to be seen.  But the energies and 
activism of a small committed group of people can change the law, 







APPENDIX – HBV Litigation (unless otherwise noted) 
# Verdict Plaintiff’s status Defendant Dist. Ct., Place Remedy: unknown 
1 10/4/07 CHEN Long Chang Shuo Tech Co. Nanhui, Shanghai D voluntarily offered 5k 
2 10/14/07 LI Sheng Nokia Dongguan, GD P couldn’t verify voice  
3 1/4/08 LI Fei Dongguan Wei Yi Da Dongguan, GD 24k ec; D promised not 
to discrim 
4 3/25/08 ZHANG Lihong Beijing Duoqi Qiye 
Consulting Co 
Chaoyang, BJ Sought 50k 
5 5/24/08 GAO Jun Bide Telecom Co. Chaoyang, BJ 17k ec, 2k emo, apology 
6 7/19/08 YUAN Ye, cg Jabil Electronics ?? Undisclosed settlement 
7 8/5/08 YUAN Yipeng 
(depression) 
IBM Shanghai Pudong LAC, SH Reinstated labor K, 57k 
in lost wages 
8 8/27/08 WANG An Hongku Electronics  Huizhou, GD 5k emo, apology 
9 10/25/08 XU Jianguo, cg Guangxi Jingui Pulp Ltd. Qinnan, Qinzhou 1st: 10k emo, 2nd:  10k 
emo 
10 11/3/08 A Gang Unnamed Co.  Nanning Sought 30k in ec 
11 12/9/08 WANG Xiaoguo, cg Mai Ke Wei Er Air Con Longgang, Shenzhen Sought 65k in ec & emo, 
apology 
12 12/10/08 TAO Ming Jiangxi Prov. Chil’s Hosp. Nanchang, Jiangxi Annulled D’s rejection 
13 12/18/08 LIANG Qi, 25 Dushi Zhongsheng Advs/. Wuhan, Hubei 5k emo, apology 
14 1/23/09 ZHANG Yun, 21 Dazhong Daily News Lixia, Jinan 15K emo, 1k ec, apology 
15 2/27/09 ZENG Lei 25 cg 
(colorblind) 
Henan Prov. Rural Credit 
Union 
Jinshui, Zhengzhou Sought 3k ec,50k emo, 
apology, job 
16 5/4/09 LI Wen, 23, cg Unnamed Tech. Co. Luogang Guangzhou 20k settlement 
17 5/29/09 WANG Zhuo, 24, MS  Unnamed Eng. SOE Chengguan, Lanzhou 15k settlement 
18 6/15/09 GONG Ping, cg Unnamed Cable Co.  Urumqi, Xinjiang 1st: 0, 2nd: 18k settlement 
19 7/9/09 YU Lihua, cg Shenzhen Development 
Bank 
Luohu, Shenzhen 3k ec, 325 for tests, 30 
for transport costs 
20 10/9/09 GUO Lin, 25, cg Fushikang Group Elec.  Jianggan, Hangzhou 5k settlement priv’y viol 
21 1/8/10 XIAO Qi Provincial Testing Ctr. Yunyan, Guiyang 1st: 0, 2nd: 0 
22 1/14/10 TANG, XIE, ZHOU Foshan Dep’t of H R Chancheng, Foshan 1st: 0, 2nd: ongoing 
23 1/25/10 DU Lan  Changsha Min’y Health  Yuelu, Changsha 1st: 0 
24 3/5/10 CHEN Ling Dechang Electronics Baoan, Shenzhen 1st: 0, 2nd: 3k in emo 
25 3/11/10 WANG Li Taipingyang Prop. Ins.  Tianhe, Guangzhou 8k emo 
Prevailing party in bold (plaintiff in bold if the case settled 
because he or she receives compensation) 
Abbreviations: CG: college graduate; ec: economic damages; emo: 
emotional distress damages; apology: court ordered defendant to 
publish written apology 
 
 
















9. verdict on file with author 
10. http://news.qq.com/a/20081103/000922.htm 
11. http://www.hbvhbv.com/forum/archiver/tid-766873.html (link no 
longer working) 
12. http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-12/10/content_10482687.htm 
13. http://health.people.com.cn/GB/14740/22121/8539958.html; verdict 
on file with author 













19. verdict on file with author 
20. http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/pfkt/content/2010-
01/07/content_2021318.htm?node=7904 
 -- http://news.sohu.com/20090520/n264061554.shtml (trial court 
decision) 
21. http://www.hrlaw315.com/news/previewnews.php?news_id=2902 
22. http://www.fzshb.cn/News/201001/5345.html  
23. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
08/12/content_11141879.htm 
24. http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2010-
01/25/content_2034671.htm?node=2 
25. http://www.zhaoniupai.com/hbv/archives/305.html 
 
 
